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PALESTINE

Fine No. 951

W pp. 3098

1978

61874

FO 371/61874

E

E 951

2

30 JAN

1947

PALESTINE

Registry
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

E951/951/31

F.O. Minute
M. House

22 Jan 1947

30 Jan 1947

Arab Views on Palestine Settlement Proposals.

Informs, it is well known the H.M. Rep's in Middle Eastern Countries, hold the view that the reaction of the Arabs to any solution to the Palestine question which they regarded as unacceptable would be violent, and that the consequences would be very serious for British interests.

(Minutes.)

Last Paper.

(5239 / 4 / 31)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

61874

(Action
completed.)

P.C.M. 24/2

(Index.)

24/4/48

Next Paper.

E977

32003 F.O.P

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Sec. of State

E 951

30 JAN

1173

13.

ANTICIPATED REACTIONS IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES TO THE DECISION
WHICH MAY BE TAKEN OVER PALESTINE

No steps have been taken since the ~~middle~~ ^{autumn} of 1945 to invite the views of H.M. Representatives in Middle Eastern countries on the subject of Palestine, but it is known that H.M. Representatives are all agreed that the reaction of the Arabs to any solution to the Palestine question which they regarded as unacceptable would be violent. The Secretary of State may however care to look again at the attached three telegrams from Sir H. Stonehewer Bird, one of May, one of July and one of December last, from which it will be seen that he holds this view very strongly, and that he believes the consequences would be very serious for British interests.

This means that we could never settle it, must go on in the present state. R.S. Stone
2nd January, 1947.
710
it is impossible
pe

This means that we could never settle it. Must we go on in the present state? It is impossible. 1173.

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FO 371/61874

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CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir H. Stonehewer Bird.
No. 390. D. 4.30 p.m. 10th May, 1946.

10th May, 1946. Re 7.42 p.m. 10th May, 1946.

Repeated to Jerusalem,
Beirut No. 64,
Jedda No. 35,
Paris - Saving.

[illegible]

My telegram No. 379.

Anglo-U.S. Committee
(1943-)

Publication of the report has already given an unwelcome fillip to the newly formed leftist parties.

/3.

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FO 371 ~~61874~~

3. I fully appreciate the delicacy and difficulty of the question for His Majesty's Government, and the grave state of displaced persons in Europe, but I feel that I should be seriously neglecting my duty if I did not add my personal appeal to that of the Regent.

4. I was in closest touch with Ibn Saud during the three most critical years of the war. When France had collapsed and we were in dire straits, the leading Arabs, from all states, felt that the golden opportunity was being missed to foment trouble for us in Palestine and Syria. Ibn Saud's reply was invariably: "The only hope of independence for the Arabs of Syria and Palestine lies in a British victory. Do nothing to impede them and trust them to keep faithful when they have won the war". At the risk of losing the friendship of France, we kept faith over Syria. Must we lose the good name which we gained from a just and courageous policy in Syria by following what the whole world will regard as a policy of enforced colonisation unparalleled in history? Worse perhaps from our point of view it will be regarded by all as a flagrant breach of faith because 1939 White Paper, much as many disliked it, was regarded as an expression of His Majesty's Government's final policy, and it is impossible to argue any Arab out of that belief.

5. It is not, however, on moral grounds alone but on grounds of long term national and imperial expediency that I plea the Arab cause. Your policy, as exposed at the Middle East Conference last September, was one of co-operation in the economic and social field and subject to

/defence

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defence in the military. This policy, in my opinion and, I believe, in that of my colleagues in other countries is doomed to complete failure if His Majesty's Government introduced a policy for Palestine unacceptable to the Arabs as a whole.

6. All of us here have been much impressed by the constancy of our friends of all classes at this critical time, but feeling against us is growing daily stronger among the irresponsible who are of course the most vocal. Those in power could only damp down hostility for as long as they believe that His Majesty's Government in spite of report will not risk the whole of their position in the Middle East by introducing a policy which will set every Arab against them and which moreover endangers the lives and property of tens of thousands of harmless indigenous Jews who have no sympathy, and are indeed strongly opposed, to Zionist aspirations.

7. A declaration by His Majesty's Government that the Arabs could appeal to U.N.O. would only be a palliative. It is of course ludicrous of the Iraqi Government to try and maintain that the Palestinian question is no concern of United States Government (see my telegram No. 365 paragraph 8) but they will I fear persist in this legalistic view. All Iraqis will maintain (as they do to us daily) that His Majesty's Government are assiduously courting the United States Government in the hope of financial favour. The geographical position of U.N.O. in United States convinces them that Jewish influence will be paramount. I hope it will also not be forgotten that while our reputation for straight [? grp. omd.] in this part of the world still stands comparatively high, American policy and enterprise is /regarded

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regarded as selfish and irresponsible. The United States cannot yet take our place or indeed even adequately share it.

8. I feel strongly that a very early statement that no final policy will be decided upon without full consultation with the Arab States is essential. I can think of nothing short of this that will enable the Regent and the Iraqi Government to stem the rising tide of anti-British feeling, which in the long run is bound to have a devastating effect on our influence in a part of the world vital to us.

Foreign Office please pass to Beirut, Jedda as my telegrams Nos. 64 and 35 respectively and Paris (for Secretary of State) as my Saving telegram No. 2.

[Repeated to Beirut and Jedda as Foreign Office telegrams Nos. 64 and 35 respectively and to Paris Conference (Saving) as No. 197 11th May, 1946]

O.T.P.

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8

FROM BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cairo,
Beirut,
Jedda,
Amman,
Jerusalem.

SECRET

There are so many courses open to His Majesty's Government and the United States Government in dealing with Palestine problem that it is difficult to envisage what the consequences are likely to be in Iraq. I feel however that I should sketch my views of the consequences of the four possible alternatives. All these must be considered in the light of the fact that Moslem months of Ramadhan begin at the end of July and fanaticism is now at a high pitch.

13.

FO 371/61874

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-2-

3. Secondly, if it is decided to admit a considerable number of Jews in the next few months but at the same time to inform the Arab world categorically that no further Jewish immigration will be permitted thereafter without the approval of the Arab States and that no transfers of land will be permitted, reaction here though very strong, might well be confined to clamour in the press, to Government protests and to demonstrations controlled by the police (though I fear large Jewish community here would suffer grievously). I think however that we might reasonably hope that Iraqi Government and probably other Arab Governments would grudgingly accept the decision if they were also assured that this was part of world-wide scheme for the relief of displaced persons and that other countries were contributing

4. Thirdly, if decision is on the lines that a considerable number of Jews will be admitted and there is no (repeat no) final [? gp. omitted] reaction would be extremely violent. It will almost certainly be necessary to evacuate all British and American women and children and though I have no doubt that to begin with police will make some effort to control the demonstrations, Government will not be able to withstand public pressure which will be fanned by Leftish parties acting for their own ends. We must therefore count on serious damage to British (including Indian) and American owned property and assaults on British and American nationals. There would be grave trouble in Kirkuk oil-field and serious reduction in deliveries to Haifa. Position of Jewish community would be critical.

5. Fourthly, if Commission's report is accepted in its entirety it will probably be necessary to evacuate all

British

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Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC SECRET.

FROM BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir H. Stonehewer Bird D: 8.10 a.m. 3rd December, 1946
No. 922
2nd December, 1946 R: 8.55 a.m. 3rd December, 1946
Repeated to New York (Federal).

&&&&&&

DEDIP

Your telegram No. 2556 to Federal New York,
paragraph 2.

I think I should stress that while it is obviously impossible to forecast exactly what will happen it is in my view highly improbable that anything in the nature of a Left-wing Government as understood in Europe will result. The new Government, though not Left-wing, might, however, be extremely nationalistic and anti-British (e.g. under Tawfiq Suwaidi).

2. Furthermore, I must repeat warnings issued from this Embassy that if decision reached on Palestine question is unacceptable to Arabs any Government, no matter how friendly it wishes to be, will be under such pressure that we shall be faced with drastic demands for Treaty revision and no military conversations on co-operation would therefore be possible. Please see my telegram No. 390 in which I reported that Regent had stressed that if Palestine solution were unacceptable,

not

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12.

-2-

not even our best friends here, including himself,
would be able to stand up for us.

Foreign Office please pass to Federal New York
as my telegram No. 1.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York
under Foreign Office No. 2671.]

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E 977
30 JAN

1947

Registry Number } E977/957/31.
TELEGRAM FROM
No. M. Eyres.
Dated Damascus.
Received in Registry } 16.
28 Jan 1947
30 Jan 1947

Arab Views on Palestine Situation.
Informs Head of President office, who stated
that President was indignant, wanted M. Eyres
to know that he intended to canvas other
Arabie Heads of States with a view to
making a joint approach to the King on
the subject of Palestine, & to instruct his
Govt to adopt a benevolent attitude towards
the Arab case.

Last Paper.

951

References.

(Minutes.)

I shouldn't think this will get very
far. See however Mr. Eyres' last sentence.

H.B. 31/1

(Print.)

See minute by Sir R. Howe an attached copy.

Off tells to M.E. posts.

R.C. 1/2

(How disposed of.)

Tel. Baghdad 87
Rtd. Cairo 246
Badda 33
Amman 30
Beirut 52
Damascus 33
Jerusalem

Feb 1.
Feb 5.

(Action completed)

(Index)

JEM 5
2 23/8/48

Next Paper.

E1047

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
FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Eyres.
No. 16

D. 9.45 p.m. 28th January 1947.
R. 8.50 a.m. 29th January 1947.

28th January 1947.

Repeated to Bagdad,
Cairo,
Jedda,
Jerusalem
Beirut Saving.



V V V

Head of President's office asked me to call this afternoon and said that the President, who is indisposed, wished me to know that he intended to canvas other Arabic heads of States with a view to making a joint approach to the King on the subject of Palestine. The Arabs saw in the Palestine Conference their last hope of a just solution and it was the President's intention to suggest to the other heads of State that His Majesty should be requested to instruct his Government to adopt a benevolent attitude towards the Arab case.

2. I was much taken aback and pointed out the obvious objections to such a démarche. But I was left with the impression that the President's mind was made up (if indeed he has not already taken the first steps) and that he only wished to inform me of his intention out of courtesy. You may therefore wish to deliver flank attack on this project through other posts concerned.

30 JAN 1947 Jerusalem please pass to Amman as my telegram No.2.

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. *E977/451/31*

I. P. G.

Draft.

| | |
|--------|------------|
| Bagdad | <i>87</i> |
| Cairo | <i>246</i> |
| Jedda | <i>33</i> |
| Amman | <i>30</i> |
| Beirut | <i>52</i> |

Telegram.

Feb 1st
Dated. . .

Repeat to:

Damascus *33*
Jerusalem

Cypher

Cabinet Dist.

Copy to:

Colonial Office.

OUT FILE

February, 1947.

15
1
2
Despatched *8.15 pm* M.

IMMEDIATE

Damascus telegram No. 16 [of the
28th January: proposed approach to
The King on the subject of Palestine].

I do not know how far this proposal
may have developed or whether the
Syrian President has yet made any
approach to the heads of other Arab
States. I shall, however, so soon as
you will take any steps which you
appropriately can to discourage the
proposal.

SG
Feb 1

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E977/951/31

16
OUT FILE

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO BAGDAD No. 87

CAIRO No. 246

JEDDA No. 33

AMMAN No. 30

BEIRUT No. 52

1st February 1947.

Repeated to Damascus No. 33
Jerusalem

TTTTT

IMMEDIATE

Damascus telegram No. 16 [of the 28th January:
proposed approach to The King on the subject of
Palestine].

I do not know how far this proposal may have
developed or whether the Syrian President has yet made
any approach to the heads of other Arab States. I
shall, however, be glad if you will take any steps
which you appropriately can to discourage the proposal.

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E 1047

17

1947

PALESTINE

3 FEB

Registry
Number

E 1047/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Mr. Tallot
Beirut

Dated

Received
in Registry

59.

31 Jan 1947

3 Jan 1947

Arab View on Palestine Situation.
 Lebanese President has informed Mr. Tallot privately
 that he has concurred in a proposal made by
 Syrian President that Heads of Arab States
 should address an appeal to the King on the
 subject of Palestine and that he has comman-
 dated the proposal to diplomatic representatives
 here of Arab States for reference to their
 Governments.

Last Paper.

977

(Minutes.)

References.

Mr. Beatty
13 Feb. 10H. Barclay
10/2

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action
completed.)

JSM 12/2

(Index.)

23/8/48

Next Paper.

E 1118

32003 F.O.P.

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Cypher/OTP.

DEPARTMENTAL NO.1.

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Talbot.
No. 59.

D. 4.24 p.m. 31st January, 1947.

R. 5.28 p.m. 31st January, 1947.

31st January, 1947.

Repeated to Jerualem,
Cairo,
Amman,
Bagdad.
Jedda,
Damasous - Saving.

E 1045

8 FEB

Palestine.

Lebanese President has informed me privately that he has concurred in a proposal made by Syrian President that heads of Arab States should address an appeal to the King on the subject of Palestine and that he has communicated the proposal to diplomatic representatives here of Arab States for reference to their Governments.

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E 1118

19

1947

PALESTINE

Registry Number } E1118/957/31.

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Dated

Received in Registry

Sir H. Storkewer
 Bird.
 Baghdad,
 106.
 14 Feb 1947
 5 Feb 1947

Prepared Appeal to H.M. the King by Arab
 Readers.

Refers Beirut Tel 59 E1047/957/31) Inform P.M.
 dined with Bogusellor on Feb 3 and informed
 him that on the day before he had received the
 appeal from the Libanon that the Regent should
 issue the proposed message to the King. The
 P.M. had heard nothing from Syria. He had
 immediately replied that the constitutional
 motion was not the same as the one in
 the Arab countries and urged caution

(Minutes.)

Last Paper.

1047

References.

Mr. Barker.

Sensible message.

S.M. 12/2

H. Beeley 1072

P.M.
 12/2

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Gentry
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23/1/48

Next Paper.

E1135

32008 F.O.P.

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E 1118

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Cypher OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir H. Stonchewer Bird
No. 106

D. 4.21 p.m. 4th February 1947.

4th February 1947. R. 4.56 p.m. 4th February 1947.

Repeated to Beirut (Please pass to Damascus as my telegram No. 8)

Jerusalem (Please pass to Amman as my telegram No. 3)

Jedda
Cairo

TTTTTT

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Beirut telegram No. 59 to you: Proposed appeal by
the House of Arab States to The King.

Prime Minister dined with the Counsellor on February 3rd and informed him that on the day before he had received the appeal from the Lebanon that the Regent should join in the proposed message to The King. The Prime Minister had heard nothing from Syria. He had immediately replied that the Constitutional position was not the same in the United Kingdom as it was in the Arab countries. Arab rulers could to large extent influence politics directly. His Majesty was bound by Constitutional practice. It was therefore vital not to

do

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- 2 -

do anything that would be unconstitutional in the United Kingdom or embarrass The King. The Lebanon should therefore instruct their representative in London to enquire whether such a démarche would be proper and effective. Meanwhile no instructions have been sent to Iraqi Ambassador in London.

2. Counsellor spoke as instructed in your telegram No. 87 to me. Nuri seemed confident that no more would be heard of this business, but in any case it seems certain that the Regent will not join in any message.

FO 371/61874

5

E

E 1135

22

1947

PALESTINE

Registry
Number E 1135/951/31.

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

M. Talbot
Beirut

Dated

7th.

Received
in Registry5 Feb 1947
6 Feb 1947

Proposed Arab Representation to H.M. King.

Refers 40th 87 (E 944/951/31) The Lebanese
President told member of Legation that
proposal had been dropped as His Majesty
led by U.K. Arab heads of states are expected
asking their representatives in London for suggestion
on a most appropriate method of approach
to His Majesty Govt.

Last Paper.

1118

(Minutes.)

References.

Egyptian Rep.

13/2

H.B. 107/2

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action
completed.)

8/21 7/2

(Index.)

103/8/48

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E 1135

23

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Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Talbot.
No. 74.

D. 5.59 p.m. 5th February, 1947.

5th February, 1947. R. 8.11 p.m. 5th February, 1947.

Repeated to Damascus,
Cairo,
Amman,
Bagdad,
Jedda,
Jerusalem.

3 5 5

IMPORTANT.

E 974/95-1/31

Your telegram No. 87 to Bagdad.
Palestine.

The Lebanese President told member of the Legation this morning that proposal had been dropped as His Majesty had left the United Kingdom.

Arab heads of state are instead asking their representatives in London for suggestions as to most appropriate method of approach to His Majesty's Government.

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6 FEB 1947

1947

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PALESTINE

E 1137

24

4 150

Registry
Number

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Dated

*Received
in Registry*

ry } E1137/957/31
er }

TELEGRAM FROM
M. Graffety Smith

Tedda.

53

4. Feb 1947

6 Feb 1947

Proposed Arab Representation to H.M. King.
Refers Beirut tel 29 (K1044/957/71) has told
Representative of M.Y. of Foreign Affairs on Feb. 3
that he considered suggestion of approach to
His Highness unwise. Said that His Majesty's
constitutional position vis-à-vis his subjects was
well known. That only would the relationship
make proposed démarche by Arab Rulers
negatively but they might make themselves
ridiculous. Asked that smoke be rolled to the Consul.

(Minutes.)

Last Paper.

1135-

References.

Mr. Gentle. [✓] CMT / 11/2

H.B.
107
2

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

95M.7.2

23/8/88

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30471 E.O.P

FO 371/61874

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25
E 1137
6 FEB

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1.

FROM JEDDA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Grafftey Smith D. 1.00 p.m. 4th February, 1947.
No. 53
4th February, 1947. R. 4.20 p.m. 4th February, 1947.

Repeated to Cairo
Bagdad
Beirut (Please pass to Damascus as my telegram No. 4).
Jerusalem (Please pass to Amman as my telegram No. 6).

0 0 0 0

Beirut telegram No. 59.

Proposed appeal to His Majesty the King about Palestine.

I told representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 3rd that I considered the Syrian suggestion of joint approach to His Majesty the King in the Palestine issue unwise.

2. I said that His Majesty's constitutional position vis à vis his Government was well known. Not only would this relationship make the proposed démarche by the Arab rulers nugatory but they might make themselves ridiculous, since others with knowledge of the facts would represent the démarche as mere Arab window dressing.

3. I asked that my remarks might be reported to King Ibn Saud.

[Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat].

6 FEB 1947

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1947

E

PALESTINE

E 1255

10 FEB

26

Registry Number E 1255/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Dated

Received in Registry

Mr. Geoffrey Smith
Sedda.
57
8. Feb 1947
10. Feb 1947

Ibn Saud and Arab Problems.

Refer 40. At 43 (T) Transmits text of message from King Ibn Saud, interpreted into following points: (A) that the King will not fight the Arab League on our behalf. (B) that the King will accept any League decision about Palestine. (C) that he will not personally initiate any action against us. (D) King stated that he would never take action (hostile) against Britain or USA.

(Minutes.)

Mr. Gansler CM 11/2

773. 11/2

Last Paper.

1137

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Miss Wingate
Room 73.
Feb 14

(Action completed.)

(In...)

PM 12/2

2/3/48

Next Paper.

1446

30471 F.O.P

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10 FEB

Cypher/OTP

FROM JEDDA TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

8th February, 1947. R. 2.0 p.m. 8th February, 1947.

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SECRET.

LIGHT.

Ibn Saud and Arab problems.

2. "I am a firm friend of the British and shall not change; but I must say to them that the Jews are dangerous to the Arabs and British alike. Even if the Arabs gave them facilities my heart would never approve a Jewish [gp. undec: ?State] because this is the danger both now and in the future. But I shall speak as the League speaks, because the League speaks for all Arabs. I shall never hasten to attack Great Britain".

3. This somewhat obscure statement may be Ibn Saud's response to your message sent through the Saudi-Arabian/

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Reference: **FO 371/61874**

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Arabian Minister in London. I hesitate to attempt to interpret but I take it as meaning:

- (a) that the King will not fight the Arab League on our behalf,
- (b) that the King will accept any League decision about Palestine,
- (c) that he will not personally initiate any action against us.

4. The King stated to my United States colleague on January 21st that he would never take hostile action against Britain or America. I have thanked him for this latest re-affirmation of his personal good-will.

Beirut please pass Important to Damascus as my telegram No. 5.

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E 1446

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PALESTINE

17. FEB

Registry
Number

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

E 1446/957/31

M. Talbot

Beirut

13. Evening

13 Feb 1947

14 Feb 1947

Lebanese Statement on Palestine.

Following is translation of reference & picture
question in reply for Foreign Affairs statement
in Lebanese Chamber on Feb 12. "I must finally
address a word to dear and brotherly Palestine. I
our heart beats here in union with hers we
associate ourselves with her national aspirations.
She may rest assured that we will be at
her side as long as her national struggle
lasts, etc etc."

Last Paper.

1255

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

223. 19/2

(Action
completed.)

(Index.)

Elm 20/2 23/8/48

Next Paper.

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E 1446

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GENERAL DISTRIBUTION FEB

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Talbot
No. 13 Saving.

13th February 1947. R. 12.10 p.m. 17th February 1947

Repeated to Damascus No. 22)
Amman No. 8.)
Bagdad No. 9) Saving.
Jedda No. 9)
Cairo No. 8)
Jerusalem No. 11)

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Palestine.

The following is a translation of the reference to the Palestine question in the Minister for Foreign Affairs' statement on 12th February in the Lebanese Chamber on the 12th February.

"I must finally address a word to dear and brotherly Palestine. Our heart beats here in unison with hers. We associate ourselves with her national aspiration. She may rest assured that we will be at her side as long as her national struggle lasts. We will defend her rights to the extreme limits of solidarity with the members of the Arab League fully convinced that her cause is ours and that the defence of her rights is ours".

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FEB 1947

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1947

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PALESTINE

E 1586

21 Feb

Registry
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

E 1586/957/31

The Arab Office

to Mr. M. Reid

7. Feb 1947

21. Feb 1947

Palestine Question
 Director of Arab Office, encloses memo
 submitted in evidence to the Anglo-American
 Committee of Enquiry on Palestine by
 Mr. T. Reid M.P. member of Woodhead
 (Partition) Commission of 1938.

Last Paper.

1446

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Off. Mr. Ragai
 Hussein
 from the to
 King of State
 ✓ March 12

(Action
completed.)

9/2/48
 9/2/48

(Index.)

23/2/48
 23/2/48

Next Paper.

E 1818

(Minutes.)

Letter to Director of Arab Office.

H.B. 21/2

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FO 371/61874

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Reference: **FO 371 61874**

Should a Jewish State be established in Palestine?

by T. Reid, C.M.G., M.P.

I have been mixed up with this problem for many years in no superficial manner. I went to Palestine in 1938 rather annoyed with Arabs and Jews for not collaborating peacefully as urged by the honest broker, Britain, the long-suffering Mandatory Power.

Having the right to probe, I probed and have probed since, the tortuous sinuosities of the subject. I found out that the elementary fact was that the honest broker had created the Palestine problem by the Balfour Declaration. Revelation came to me as I got behind the smoke screen of propaganda and discovered one of the most remarkable achievements in history. I found that in Britain, America and other countries, decent peoples, misled by one-sided propaganda - the Arabs being far away and not provided with money which speaks in politics - peoples densely ignorant of the facts, had been led by the cause of the political Zionists was just and wise, though it was contrary to every known principle of morals or law. Now I was old-fashioned enough to agree with Burke, whom I quoted in my dissent on the Partition Commission's Report : "It is with the greatest difficulty that I am able to separate policy from justice. Justice is itself the great standing policy of civil society; and any eminent departure from it, under any circumstances, lies under the suspicion of being no policy at all". Yes, honesty is the best policy.

I still adhere to my old-fashioned views of what true statesmanship is. I am pro justice, pro Arab, pro Briton, pro Jew; and I consider that the setting up of a Jewish state in Palestine would be disastrous for all of them and to the last degree immoral and unjust.

The Palestine problem was and still is caused by the attempt to establish there a Jewish State. That problem cannot begin to be solved until it is decided whether a Jewish State is or is not

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When the Israelites, about 1100 B.C., entered the hill country round Jerusalem, the area now called Palestine was not uninhabited. Long before that Semitic or other peoples had poured across the Arabian deserts into the country now called Palestine. Egyptian Kings ruled this area before the Israelites came, probably from Egypt. to which they had emigrated.

They fought with their neighbours the Philistines on the coast and others, and there were inter-tribal Israelite wars. Their territory varied in size according to the fortunes of war. In the 10th century B.C. under Solomon and David they united and conquered probably a great part of the area now called Palestine. Then they split into two hostile states, the northern of Israel in Samaria, the southern of Judaea round Jerusalem, and the coastal peoples regained their independence. Both kingdoms retained a precarious sort of independence for about two centuries.

In the 8th century B.C. the Assyrians imposed their rule over both and over Judaea and Israel.

In the 7th and 6th centuries the Babylonians conquered both Kingdoms and Palestine, sacked Jerusalem and dispersed the Jews.

In 539 Cyrus of Persia conquered Babylon and allowed those Jews who so desired to return to their former domicile in Palestine, which for three or four centuries was a satrapy of the Persian Empire.

In the 4th century B.C. Alexander the Great conquered the Near East. He took the Jewish settlers to Alexandria. On his death his general Ptolemy ruled in Palestine. Later the rival Greek ruler Antiochus of Antioch of the Seleucid dynasty conquered Palestine.

The attempt to establish the Greek polytheistic religion inter alia led to a revolt by the monotheistic Jews under their priest kings the Maccabees in the second century B.C. and for a brief period Judaea was again independent.

The Roman Pompey stormed Jerusalem in 63 B.C. since when (2,000 years ago) there has not been a Jewish State in any part of what is now called Palestine. It became practically a Roman

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province, though rulers like Herod were allowed to call themselves kings. Later the local rulers were called procurators, of whom Pontius Pilate was one.

The Jews revolted against Roman rule and Titus sacked Jerusalem in A.D. 70. Later rebellions by a Messiah and others led to the wholesale destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans in 135 A.D. and the deportation of the Jews. Only a few thousand were left in their homeland. But at the time there were about five times as many Jews in the rest of the Roman Empire as there were in Palestine.

After 500 years of Roman rule, in the seventh century A.D., the Arabs, breaking out of the Arabian desert, conquered all Syria including Palestine and set up an empire stretching from Baghdad to Spain, which lasted about 300 years. In Jerusalem they had a University and built the beautiful Mosque, the Dome of the Rock, on the site of the Jewish Temple. They ruled in turn from Medina, Damascus or Baghdad.

In the 11th century the Seljuk Turks conquered all Syria. From 1095 on the Crusaders held, till the end of the 12th century, a precarious kingdom of Jerusalem. They almost exterminated the Jews of southern Syria, Palestine.

For the next 200 years the Mameluke dynasty of Egypt ruled all Syria, during which period Mongol raids devastated it.

In 1517 the Ottoman Turks conquered Syria and ruled all Syria till 1918. Since then no state has ruled Palestine as a sovereign authority.

Some of those Jews persecuted in the West by Christians had returned to Palestine and in 1845 there were about 12,000 Jews in Palestine. Before 1900 Baron Rothschild and others financed Jewish settlements or colonies in Palestine which increased the Jewish population there.

During the first world war the Turks killed Arab leaders of Syria, starved and ruined the country, including Palestine, and about 12,000 Jewish refugees fled to Alexandria in American ships. In 1919, after the war, there were about 60,000 Jews in

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the area now called Palestine and about 650,000 Arabs exclusive of Bedouin. These Arabs were very mixed; they were the descendants of the various peoples who, before and after the Israelites' arrival had invaded Palestine from across Arabia and from elsewhere, with whom the Arab conquerors ^{had} intermixed. They were mostly Moslems but there were nearly 100,000 Arab Christians. The bond of all in 1919 was the Arabic language, Arab ways of life and the memory of Arab greatness in arts and arms. All Syria, including its southern counties or Sanjaks of Acre, Balqa and the Sanjak of Jerusalem (all later made into modern Palestine) had been ruined by 400 years of blighting Turkish rule, during which it was handed over to the tax gatherer to whom the revenues were farmed out. In this period neither Arab nor Jew could progress. It was ruined by the war and the ruthless cruelty practised on the people by the Turks when Arab disloyalty was discovered. Hundreds of thousands had died of ~~starvation and disease~~. The Arab population had long been concentrated in thousands annually to serve in the Turkish armies. It was the southern part of this helpless, down-and-out Syria, Palestine, that the political Zionists claimed in view of the historical facts sketched above. The prospects of aggression were good. How could the ruined country, unorganised politically, resist? Who would have thought that neighbouring Arab states would intervene?

However, Mr. Asquith, British Premier, on hearing of this proposal, deemed it foolish. In truth, it was audacious. It proposed to deprive the people of Palestine of the sovereignty of their country. About 2,000 years before the Jews had ruled parts of Palestine for a few centuries. The Arabs had ruled the country centuries later for about 300 years and had never been expelled. Their ancestors had lived there for at least 1,300 years. Even under the Turks the population was almost entirely Arab. In 1919 the Arab population was at least ten times that of the Jews, of whom about a third were recent immigrants. The prescriptive rights of the inhabitants of Palestine as against Jews domiciled outside of Palestine were irrebuttable. The Zionist claim was baseless. The Arab denial of it on any ground, moral or political, was un-

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answerable. As between Jew and Arab, the land was an Arab land entitled to native sovereignty after the war of 1914 to 1918, not liable to loss of sovereignty to immigrants.

It remains now to see if the political Zionists have established since 1919 any moral, political or legal right to set up a Jewish state in Palestine. When the Turks gave up Syria including Palestine, people, in President Wilson's words, were not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty. Turkey surrendered her Arab lands in the final peace treaty. Now President Wilson had declared before the war ended, in his Fourteen Points, that the nationalities under Turkish rule should be assured unmolested opportunity of autonomous development. And the Allies fought for the right of self-determination for all peoples. Even if the Arabs had not lifted a finger to free themselves, the Allies had no right to set up a Jewish State. But who were the Allies? Britain, France, America, others and the Arabs. Their leader, the Sharif of Mecca, had rejected Turkey's demand that he should proclaim a Jihad against the Allies and the Arabs had entered the war in 1916 on the side of the other Allies in a written Treaty signed in that year with Britain, the agreement being that Arab territories were to be independent, when the Turks had been defeated. So, again, the allies of the Arabs, much less Britain, had no right to set up a Jewish State in Palestine, no moral, no legal right. Even if Palestine had been excluded in the Treaty from the area to be given independence, which was not the case, Britain had no right, as the Haugham Committee admitted in 1939, to dispose of Palestine. Even when Britain got a mandate from the Allies to govern Palestine temporarily till the country became independent, that mandate gave neither Britain nor any other states legal or moral right to dispose of the sovereignty of Palestine without the consent of the people, over 90% of whom were Arab, whose ancestors had lived there for 13 centuries at least.

To get the thing in true perspective, neither the Allies nor Britain had any right to hand over Palestine to anyone, nor any

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right to prescribe its future ^{on its future} population without the consent of the people, who were not primitive ~~or~~ savages. As Lord Samuel, one of the authors of the crazy political Zionists' plan, rendered wiser by experience later, said in 1939; "The Arabs are intensely aware of their history - that they acquired great territory, built up a remarkable culture and gave to the world one of its greatest civilizations." It is the descendants of these people whom we are asked to hand over to the rule of the Jewish immigrants.

Now let us examine the pledges given to the Arabs before they entered the war in which, according to General Allenby, they rendered "invaluable services" and fulfilled their part of the agreement. The pledges bound Britain which gave them and bind Britain today, unless we are to imitate the Kaiser and Hitler who regarded treaties as scraps of paper when no longer of use to them.

The British Government in the McMahon pledges of 1916 in a lengthy correspondence with the Sharif of Mecca agreed to the independence after the war of the north west coastal districts west of Aleppo, Loms Hama and Lamasacus, where France had interests and where the population was not mainly Arab (not a word excluded Palestine). Britain refused to publish this correspondence for two decades. But the Arabs 20 years later managed to piece it together and force publication; and the Maughan Committee of 1939, composed of Arabs and British, examined it; the former argued that the pledges included Palestine, the latter that they did not. Sir Henry McMahon said twenty years after 1916 that he had not intended to include Palestine. But undisclosed intentions do not override the written words of an agreement or bind the victims of one party's mental reservations or muddles. Sir Henry also said that the Sharif was aware of this undisclosed reservation. The Sharif was not.

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Even the British members of the Balfour Committee agreed in 1939 that the Sharif had included Palestine in his claim. In word and act after 1916 the Sharif asserted this claim.

The agreement excluded, unless the French later agreed, the districts lying to the west of Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo, that is the north west coastal districts of Syria. But Palestine lies south of even the most southerly of these, Damascus.

The Western boundary of the territory to be independent was the Mediterranean which ^{is} the western boundary of Palestine.

But the British Government argued that the districts west of Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo included Palestine and that the Jordan was the western boundary of the territory promised independence.

The Arabic word used in the correspondence was wilaya (translated district.) Now it meant the environs of the four places which stood in a line from north to south in north Syria. But Britain asserted that vilayata was meant, a vilayet being an administrative Turkish province with definite boundaries. Now either environ or vilayet was meant. If vilayet was meant, then we have to admit that, though there was a vilayet of Aleppo, a large area, there was no vilayet of Damascus, no vilayet of Hama, and no vilayet of Homs. Nevertheless, said the British representatives on the Committee, Damascus was the capital of the Vilayet of Syria, so the vilayet of Syria must have been meant. And Hama and Homs were thrown in by Sir H. McMahon loosely, just to indicate the boundaries of the vilayet of Syria. But even the Vilayet of Syria did not include the Sanjak or county of Jerusalem, which was more than half modern Palestine. Never mind that snag. It, too, was dragged in by a side wind, vilayet or no vilayet. And the rest of modern Palestine was dragged in by saying that the vilayet of Beirut was meant by the word districts, though a lot of it is south of Damascus. In the end the British team admitted that there was more in the Arab contention than had hitherto appeared, and that discovery after 23 years!

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There was in the Arab contention of truth exactly 100 per cent; and the wriggling of Britain in 1922 about vilayets was ^a desperate attempt to justify its plan to exclude Palestine and give it to Jewish immigrants. Britain, in written words without ambiguity, promised independence to Palestine in 1916. No court or arbitrator would entertain any plea to the contrary.

Does this fact justify the setting up of a Jewish State in Palestine now by Britain or anyone else? Are British pledges scraps of paper? France was not informed of this treaty and when informed was troublesome because France wanted to take over the whole of Syria, whereas in the power politics game Britain had long been trying to get southern Syria, that is Palestine, as her share of the spoils. The Maughan Committee nevertheless asserted, to prove that Palestine was excluded in 1916, that Sir H. MacMahon could not have meant to give it as the French claimed it. In 1917 Britain issued an immoral and illegal document, the Balfour Declaration, for this very territory, Palestine, claimed by the French, not owned by French or British, with the secret undisclosed object, as Mr. Lloyd George said later, of letting the Jews one day convert the national home into a Jewish State. Yet it was alleged that Britain for fear of France dared not pledge Palestine to the people of Palestine in 1916.

Whatever Sir Henry intended, his letters bound Britain to agree to the independence of Palestine. In my search for truth through the tortuous dealings about Palestine, including the casuistry of the British members of the 1939 Committee, I have not been very proud of my country's third-rate, low statesmanship, the very opposite of the first-class stuff described by Burke. Most of the British politicians who dealt with this issue were fooled time and again by the Zionist leaders.

Well, France gave trouble. So the Sykes Picot arrangement was made without the knowledge of the Arabs in 1916, carving up spheres of influence in Syria and Turkey between Russia, France and Britain. This was kept absolutely secret and no wonder. The Arabs were fighting well for their promised independence.

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The Arabs in the Turkish army were deserting in thousands. Several divisions of them had to be moved by the Turks to fight in the west. And the Sykes Picot agreement flatly contradicted the McMahon pledge and might destroy Anglo-Arab co-operation and the services of the Arabs were essential for Allenby's victory.

The fat was in the fire properly when the Bolsheviks after the 1917 revolution ~~in Russia~~ published the Sykes-Picot treaty, and when rumours of it reached the Arabs through the Turkish lines. When Colonel Lawrence heard of it he told the Sharif's son Feisal, who led the Arabs in the field. He tried to reassure Feisal. The Turks used the occasion to offer the Arabs a separate peace. The Sharif rejected it and asked the Cairo British authorities for an explanation. Cairo asked the Foreign Office for help which, confronted with its duplicity or muddle, replied with evasive equivocation in February 1918, but reiterated its former pledge to stand by the Arabs in their struggle for liberation.

In 1917 the British Government issued the long-intended, illegal and immoral Balfour Declaration, again made disgracefully without the knowledge of the Arabs, viewing with favour the establishment of a Jewish national home in the Palestine already promised to her allies the Arabs, the Palestine which was then in possession of the Turks, which Britain did not own and which she does not own now. It had been held up by Tzarist Russia, British Jewry and other obstacles and was not issued till the victory of Allenby in Syria was a certainty. Victory was achieved in 1918. The Sharif (now King Hussein) asked for an explanation when he heard of the Balfour Declaration and Commander Hogarth was sent to allay his fears. He told Hussein that "Jewish settlement in Palestine could only be allowed in so far as it would be consistent with the political and economic freedom of the Arab population." Mr. M. McDonald, Colonial Secretary, corroborated this in his speech in the House of Commons in 1939. So Hussein agreed to provide a refuge for

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the Jews from persecution. He sent out messages to his followers, Feisal included, saying that he had assurances from Britain that future Arab independence in Palestine was not in question. But the immoral and illegal Sykes Picot agreement and the illegal and immoral Balfour Declaration had aroused Arab suspicions and unrest and there was danger to the cause.

Seven Egyptian Arabs asked the British Government for a clear statement of its policy. The British Government's reply of 1918, published and sent to King Hussein, dealt with many Arab territories. For Palestine it stated that the future government of it should be based on the consent of the governed and that Britain would work for its freedom and independence. There is nothing like danger to make people despondent over the British Government's dubious policy and therefore virtuous. The Arabs, instead of being dangerous, hailed the statement with jubilation. Next month, Americans please note President Wilson announced that post war settlement would be based immediately concerned." The Arab forces went in with zest on Allenby's right for the final kill in that brilliant campaign and entered Damascus in triumph.

Is a Jewish State to be set up or are the pledges of President Wilson, of Dr. Hogarth, the pledges to the Seven, to be scraps of paper like the other pledges?

At the end of 1918, owing to troubles from the Arabs in Beirut, reserved pro tempore for the French in the McMahon correspondence, an Anglo-French declaration was issued announcing as joint aims the complete and final liberation of the populations living under the Turkish yoke and the setting up of national governments chosen by the people themselves in the free exercise of the national will. Feisal had told Allenby he could not allay Arab suspicions or keep his forces in control unless an authoritative statement of policy was issued. Danger produced again a quick proclamation of virtue and good faith. Like the others this proclamation prevented an Arab-British rupture. Is this concrete Anglo-

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French Declaration also to be a scrap of paper?

To reassure the puzzled Arabs further and keep them fighting the British dropped thousands of leaflets on Palestine, signed by the British command and the Sharif, promising independence and urging the Arabs to help their liberators. So the Arabs welcomed the British and Arabs as they advanced. Were these bits of paper merely meant to fool the Arabs while their help was essential, mere scraps of paper? Or are we bound to honour them? Do they justify the setting up of a Jewish state in Palestine?

France held Britain to the Sykes Picot agreement which probably bound neither after the defection of Russia. Mr. Lloyd George wanted to shelve it. So Syria was unjustly partitioned after victory, regardless of the economic and political harm done thereby. Out of it was carved modern Palestine, containing the Sanjak of Jerusalem and the Sanjaks of Haifa and Latakia. France took a mandate for the north, Britain for what is now Palestine. Again note the sublime justice of the proceedings. The Arabs as usual were not consulted in the framing of the Mandate. In the Mandate for Palestine the Balfour Declaration is included. So the Zionists getting busy have established their national home in Palestine, their language, synagogues, university, settlements, industries, cultural and other public bodies and institutions. In 1939 the British Government officially acknowledged that the national home had been established.

From 60,000 they have increased to over 600,000, a tenfold increase in 25 years and that though about 50,000 Jews have emigrated from Palestine since 1920. From about 10 per cent of the population, the Jews have increased to about 35 per cent. And Palestine has taken about half a million Jews, most of whom were forced in against the wishes and forcible resistance of the Arabs by British bayonets, 25,000 by illegal entry. Britain has implemented the establishment of the national home a hundred

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per cent. They remain her pledges to the Arabs apart from the moral and legal right of Palestine to independence even if there were no pledges.

The political Zionists asked for a Jewish State in 1917. The British Government, thinking that Jewish political support would be useful, especially to bring America into the war, mainly for strategic reasons, issued the long contemplated Balfour Declaration. Mr. Asquith said, when he was Prime Minister, that Mr. Lloyd George did not care a damn for the Jews or what happened to them. The British motive was strategic. Of course, the British peoples had to be fed with sentiment about Zion and the dispersal of the Jews of Palestine who had dispersed of their own accord long before the Romans dispersed them.

In 1918, Dr. Weizmann, the Zionist leader, stated at Government House, Jerusalem, to assembled Jew and Arab notables: "Let my hearers beware of treacherous insinuations that Zionists are seeking political power - rather let both progress together until they are ready for a joint autonomy." Today he asks for a Jewish State.

But the British Government, while offering the Zionists rights in Palestine which only a sovereign state in possession of Palestine had the right to offer, whereas Britain neither owned nor possessed nor ruled Palestine, did not offer and has not offered the Zionists a Jewish State in Palestine. It said in effect: "I, A., offer you C., rights in B.'s property short of sovereignty; but off the record I hope you, C., will one day take away B.'s sovereignty as well. But we will not publish our secret understanding to the proposed victims the people of Palestine."

Even if Britain had offered sovereignty, she had and has no more right to offer it than America would have to offer the sovereignty of Wales to the descendants of the ancient Druids scattered all over the earth or than Britain would have to offer a Puritan, British State in Florida to the non-conformists of Britain whose ancestors sailed in the Mayflower.

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Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations of 1920 states that peoples not yet able to stand alone should be a sacred trust under a mandatory. And it goes on to say of Arab territories formerly belonging to Turkey that they have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised.

The Mandate of 1923 was issued under this clause of the Covenant, but it did not provisionally recognise Palestine's independence. And the sacred trust was discharged by a secret intention to transfer Palestine's sovereignty to Jewish immigrants when they had a majority. Was this fair play? But even the Mandate prescribed the development of self-governing institutions and of encouraging local autonomy. It envisaged a Palestinian State which is now over-due. A Jewish State would be a violation even of the Mandate.

The Balfour Declaration and the Mandate have caused continual strife in Palestine. The Arabs have opposed both and their side to get political and economic domination over down and out Palestine, by mass immigration to secure a majority and thereby a de facto Jewish State and by squeezing the Arabs off the land by purchase of it at any price and by making it thereafter inalienable to Arabs and by refusing to employ Arabs on it or in Jewish enterprises, wherever possible. The Zionist policy was gradual extermination of the Arabs economically and gradual outstripping of them in numbers. The honest broker, Britain, condoned all this till 1939. How the Labour Party could support this non-socialist policy opposed to their policy elsewhere of promoting self-government passes comprehension.

The Peel Commission in 1937 recommended, not a spiritual and cultural national home, but a Jewish State in part of Palestine and brutally hinted at compulsory eviction of the Arabs to make room for the Jews. I helped to upset that unjust scheme in 1938 as a member of the Partition Commission and I am not ashamed of my work. My dissent raised some awkward issues, moral and political. I unmasked the make-believe and helped to force an

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exceptionally incompetent British Government to drop its policy and to accept, inter alia, my views roughly 100 per cent. The White Paper of 1939 is little more than an endorsement of the Partition Commission's proposals. The latter indicated that partition was impracticable. So did I, but I also said that it was immoral. This White Paper envisaged the independence of Palestine in 1949. Since 1939 the French, who did many good and ~~bad~~ bad things in Syria, for their own and Syrian good, have been forced out of Syria. It is high time we also quitted Palestine. The White Paper of 1939 stated: "His Majesty's Government now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State." And it ~~is~~ declared that after 75,000 more Jewish immigrants entered the country, there was to be no more Jewish immigration without the consent of the Arabs. ^{all} Is that to be another scrap of paper?

The Arabs are willing to let the National Home remain with its 600,000 Jews. The task is to secure real guarantees for the security and equal treatment of those Jews if they become citizens of a Palestinian State. Many wish to quit the country now; many have retained the citizenship of the countries they came from. If the infamous policy of setting up a Jewish State by Britain or America or other foreign powers which have no moral or legal right to dispose of Palestine is abandoned, conciliation between Palestinian Jew and Arab, who both long for peace and prosperity, will in my opinion be not impossible, though there will be some fanatical Jews who will, and indeed already have resorted to force to win the sovereignty of Palestine. We need not expect to make Palestine amiable without breaking eggs. But we have got to do justice at long last to the people of Palestine of whom over 60 per cent are still Arabs in an Arab country inhabited by their ancestors for 13 centuries.

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Reference: FO 371/61874

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I have spoken so far from the standpoint of fair play and legality. Let us for a moment for the sake of argument scrap both and regard as scraps of paper all the documents I have quoted. Let us descend to the level of the so-called practical man, who despises, as I do not, the imponderables and looks at the material pros and cons about the only things he is able to comprehend.

Now, what have ~~the~~ ~~xxx~~ Arabs, Jews, Britons, Americans or the world to gain materially by imposing a Jewish State on Palestine directly, or indirectly by forcing Jewish mass immigration on the country? Who is to do the fighting? Jews, Britons, or Americans? Would any British or American Government dare to send its young men to die zealously scaling the walls of Jerusalem as modern crusaders, to set up a Jewish graveyard in the battlefields and the corpses of the Arab inhabitants? Let us face the facts and let British and American Governments face these facts. Or can we who made the Palestine problem now leave Arabs or Palestine Jews in the lurch to fight it out? The unfortunate British taxpayer has already given to the Palestine Government over £13,000,000 to keep it from bankruptcy, exclusive of the enormous cost of military operations. It cost about £40,000,000 to put down the Irak rebellion and then we gave Irak independence after all. Will the British or American taxpayer pay millions of pounds to establish by force a Jewish State in Palestine? Ask the electorate already sick of inundating Palestine with blood and treasure. Ask the American party machines vote catching for Jewish votes in the busy streets of New York, Illinois and elsewhere.

If there be people, of whom I am one, who know this subject and are in a position to demand and give information, who can let the public know the correct interpretation of the carnage and its cost, will it be possible, as in the past

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Reference: **FO 371 61874**

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49

The Palestine problem cannot be solved till the unjust and
unwise policy of establishing a Jewish State there or in any

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2

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Reference:-

FO 371/61874

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

3149 Wt. 26469/137 100m 9/46 (51) F.&S.

Registry
No.

| |
|---------------|
| Top Secret. |
| Secret. |
| Confidential. |
| Restricted. |
| Open. ✓ |

Draft. letter to
Mr. Rajai

Husseini.
The Arab Office
92, Eaton Place, London.
(from Pri. Sec.

to Minister
of State)

Private Secretary
to M/S [initials]

OUT FILE

757
12 [initials]

+ O C

Dear Mr. Hussein,

The Minister of State
has asked me to thank
you for the copy of Mr. T.
Reid's evidence to the Anglo-
American Committee of Enquiry
which you kindly sent to
him on February 7th

Yours sincerely

(Sgd) G. V. Roberts

H.B. 21/2

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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Reference: FO 371/61874

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OUT FILE FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

12th March, 1947

52

No. 1586/951/31

Dear Mr. Hussein,

The Minister of State has asked me to thank you for the copy of Mr. T. Reid's evidence to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry which you kindly sent to him on 7th February.

Yours sincerely

(Sgd.) G. V. Rob.

(Private Secretary
to Minister of State)

Mr. Rajai Hussein,
The Arab Office,
92, Eaton Place,
S.W.1.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |

Reference: FO 371/61874

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E

E 1818

28 FEB

1947

PALESTINE

Registry
Number

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

E 1818/51/31

Rt. H. Horekewer

-Bird

Bagdad

185

28 Feb 1947

28 Feb 1947

Last Paper.

1586

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Tel Bagdad 204
 Rptd. Buirs 506
 Beirut 154
 Damascus 119
 Ladda 117
 Amman 91
 Jerusalem
 U.K. and
 New York 713
 Mar 5

(Action
completed.)

G E 1107/3

(Index.)

23/8/48

Next Paper.

2077

Palestine, Reference to U.N.O.

Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs has heard
 reported suggestion by cable to Sec' Gen of
 U.N.O. that a special meeting of Assembly should
 be called forthwith. Minister for Foreign Affairs
 has asked whether this is correct, because in the
 event of same, Iraqi Govt wish to summon
 a special meeting of the Arab League to
 call Palestine.

(Minutes.)

Draft submitted

H.B. 5/3

W.M. 5/2

Tel. initials of Sir R. Hours and sent.

H.B. 5/3

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
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Reference: FO 371/61874

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54 A

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorized recipient and not passed on.]

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir H. Stonehewer Bird D: 10.15 a.m. 28th February, 1947
No. 185
 28th February, 1947 R: 11.10 a.m. 28th February, 1947

Repeated to U.K. Delegation New York,
Amman Saving
Beirut "
Cairo "
Damascus "
Jedda "
Jerusalem "

~~~~~

**IMMEDIATE.**  
**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**STANT**

Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs has heard on the radio reported suggestion by cable to Secretary General of U.N.O. that a special meeting of the Assembly should be called forthwith. Minister for Foreign Affairs has asked me to find out whether this is correct [? grp. omitted ? and] whether the Assembly is likely to meet and if so when. I shall be grateful for very early reply as in the event of a meeting of U.N.O. to which the Palestine question would be submitted, Iraqi Government wish to summon a special meeting of the Arab League to discuss Palestine.

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom  
Delegation as my telegram No.1.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York by Foreign Office.]

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|                                          | 1 |   |   | 2 |   |

Reference: **FO 371/61874**

E 1818 / 951 / 31

*Draft.*

~~Top Secret~~  
~~Secret~~  
Confidential  
~~Restricted~~  
~~Open~~

Telegram. Bagdad  
No. 204 ..... V  
(Date) Mar 5.

*Repeat to :—*

Cairo 506 ✓  
 Beirut 154 ✓  
 Damascus 119 ✓  
 Jerusalem  
 U.S. Delegation, N. Y.  
 En Clair. 713.  
 Code.  
 Cypher.

**Distribution :—**

World  
Organisation

Copies to :—  $\frac{H.T.B. 5}{3}$   
 $\frac{W.M. 5}{3}$

**OUT FILE**

*F. O.,*

194

*Despatched*

9.20 P M.

Immediate  
Confidential.  
Your telegram no. 185 [of  
February 28th: reference of Palestine  
to United Nations]

We are anxious that the United Nations should start work on this problem before September. If they do not, there is a strong risk that the 1947 Assembly will appoint a Committee to examine the problem and to report back in 1948.

2. Sir A. Cadogan is at present consulting the Secretary General on possible procedures for enabling

**NOTHING TO BE WITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.**

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FO 371/61874

enabling preparatory work to be  
 done in advance of the September  
 Assembly. <sup>With this object</sup> ~~In this connection~~ a  
 special session of the Assembly,  
 for the purpose of appointing a  
 committee and determining its  
 terms of reference, has been  
 considered. The Secretary General  
 however prefers the alternative of an  
 ad hoc committee appointed by  
 himself. He is now sounding the  
 other delegates of the Big Five on  
 this idea.

R.V.H.  
 5.3

56

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Reference:

FO 371/61874

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CYPHER/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO BAGDAD

No. 204

D: 9.20 p.m. 5th March 1947

5th March 1947

Repeated to: Cairo No. 506  
Beirut No. 154  
Damascus No. 119  
Jedda No. 117  
Amman No. 91  
Jerusalem  
United Kingdom Delegation New York  
No. 713.

ppppp

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123456

12

Reference:-

FO 371 61874

Your telegram No. 185 [of February 28th: reference of Palestine to United Nations].

We are anxious that the United Nations should start work on the Palestine problem before September. If they do not, there is a strong risk that the 1947 Assembly will appoint a Committee to examine the problem and to report back in 1948.

2. Sir A.Cadogan is at present consulting the Secretary General on possible procedures for enabling preparatory work to be done in advance of the September Assembly. With this object a special session of the Assembly, for the purpose of appointing a Committee and determining its terms of reference, has been considered. The Secretary General however prefers the alternative of an ad hoc Committee appointed by himself. He is now sounding the other delegates of the Big Five on this idea.

11

E

E 2077

58

1947

PALESTINE

Registry  
Number

E 2077/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Dated

Received  
in Registry

Mr Eyles

Damascus

14 Jaring.

1. Mar 1947

11. Mar 1947

Palestine, Arab Views.

Refer Damascus 13 Jaring (I 1118/1/16) In  
conversation with MOHSEN BARAZI he said  
President was delighted with Mr Eyles statement on  
Palestine of Feb 25. He cleared the air and explained  
that A.M.G. were not antagonistic to the Arabs.  
If U.N. decided against the Arabs the responsibility  
of chaos for all to see. If on the other hand  
decision was in favour of Arabs they would know  
11 Mar were Arabs to thank.

Last Paper.

(Minutes.)

1818

References.

H73. 11/3

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action  
completed.)

G R M 12/3

(Indy)

23/4/48

Next Paper.

2083

32008 F.O.P.

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Reference

FO 371/61874

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GENERAL DISTRIBUTION


FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Eyres  
No. 14 Saving  
1st March, 1947

R. 11.20 a.m. 8th March, 1947

Repeated to Cairo No. 9 Saving  
Beirut No. 21 Saving  
Bagdad No. 11 Saving  
Jedda No. 11 Saving  
Jerusalem No. 9 Saving  
Amman No. 12 Saving  
Angora No. 3 Saving


ddddddd



My immediately preceding Saving telegram.

In the same conversation Mohsen Barazi said that the President was delighted with your statement on Palestine in the House on 25th February. It cleared the air and showed that His Majesty's Government were not antagonistic to the Arabs. If eventually United Nations Organisation decided against the Arabs the reason would be clear for all to see: if, on the other hand, the decision was in favour of the Arabs, they would know that His Majesty's Government were largely to thank.

2. Informed public opinion and press comment is along similar lines.



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12

1947

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PALESTINE

E 2033

II

60

Registry  
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received  
in Registry

E 2033/951/31

Arch by Clarke

Paris

to M. Borden

336/15/47

4. 11. 1947

11

Palestine, Arab Views.

transmit account of conversation with  
Groggi minutes who expressed gratification  
at M. Borden's statement on Palestine and said  
that all our Arab colleagues felt likewise.  
THASIN KADRY REY then gave an account  
of a recent episode with an American who  
offered to pay well for a large number of Jews  
in Lodz who were allowed to leave for Palestine.

Last Paper.

2077

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action  
completed.)

(Index.)

J. D. M. 4/2

15/8/48

Next Paper.

E 242

32003 F.O.P.

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Reference: FO 371/61874

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336/15/47.

Paris.

4th March, 1947.

**F 2003**

Dear Baxter,


After dealing with a few questions of details he expressed his own gratification at Mr. Bevin's recent statement on Palestine and said that all our Arab colleagues felt likewise. One of them had rung him up to say that no-one could have put the Arab case more fairly.

Government <sup>what the</sup> American wanted apparently was that the Iraqi Baghdad (there are some one hundred thousand of them) to leave Iraq for Palestine. This proposal angered the Minister who tells me that at this point he felt a little plain speaking was called for. He told his visitor in the first place that all the dollars that the Zionists in America could produce would not buy either himself or his Government; for Iraq and other Arab countries the Arab position in Palestine was fundamental. In fact, there were only two subjects on which all Arabs were agreed, i.e. Islam and Palestine, and on these subjects they felt very strongly. The Zionists appeared to be under the impression that with the aid of money and perhaps by inciting their Government to take direct action they could bring about a purely Jewish Palestine. Even if such an attempt achieved an apparent initial success it could not possibly last since the whole hinterland constituted by the Arab States would be united against it; Great Britain knew this well and her policy had been guided by a perfectly realistic determination not to sacrifice the friendship and support of the Arab, and indeed the Moslem, world generally. The Minister added that he believed that much of the present terrorism was engineered and executed by Jews who had come to Palestine from Iraq and Arabia. This fact, which was generally known in his country, did not endear the Jews who enjoyed the hospitality of Iraq to his compatriots, and as long as the Palestine trouble lasted there was always a danger of an anti-Jewish massacre.

/All

C.W. Baxter, Esq., C.M.G., M.C.,  
Eastern Department,  
Foreign Office, S.W.1.

FO 371/61874



2.

All this appears to have taken Tahsin's American visitor by surprise who said that he had no idea that Iraqis felt so strongly on the matter. All in all, the conversation seems to have been a salutary eye-opener.

Yours ever,

Ashley Clarke

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Reference:

FO 371/61874

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13

1947

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E 2142

12 MAR

PALESTINE

Registry  
Number

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Dated

Received  
in Registry

E2142/957/31  
 Sir. Id. Horekewar  
 Bagdad.  
 215  
 8 MAR 1947  
 12 -

Palestine, Arab League Meeting.  
 Foreign Minister for Foreign Affairs states he  
 has telephoned all Arab States suggesting  
 meeting of Ministers on Mar 12, preferably  
 in Damascus to discuss the line to be taken  
 about Palestine at the next Arab League Meeting.  
 He also said the Egyptian Minister had called  
 to say his Govt. would represent Egypt  
 at the next meeting of the League. It was also  
 noted in the Committee report to the Council.

Last Paper.

2083

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

H. Beeley

12/13

12/13  
 12/13

(Action  
completed.)

(Index.)

9 MAR 13/3  
 24/8/48

Next Paper.

2143

32003 F.O.P.

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E 21426

12 MAR

CYPHER/OTP.

DEPARTMENTAL NO:1.

FROM BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir H. Stonehewer Bird.  
No: 215.  
8th March 1947.

D. 8.55 a.m. 10th March 1947.

R. 9.20 a.m. 10th March 1947.

Repeated to Beirut ( Please pass to Damascus as my telegram  
22),  
Jerusalem.  
Jedda.  
Amman.  
Cairo.  
and Aden. (for Yemen).

4 4 4 4

Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs says he has telegraphed  
to all the Arab States suggesting that Arab [grp.undec:]  
Ministers meet on 12th March preferably in Damascus to discuss  
the line to be taken about Palestine at the next Arab League  
meeting.


2. He also said the Egyptian Minister had called to say  
his Government hoped Nuri would represent Iraq at the next  
meeting of the League "to clear the matter up". (This  
presumably refers to Azzam).

3. The Iraqi Government is pledged to resign immediately  
the elections are over i.e. on 11th March so I cannot at  
present say who will attend from Iraq.

Foreign Office please pass to Amman and Aden (Yemen) as  
my telegrams 13 and 1 respectively.

[Repeated to Amman].

[Copies sent to Telegram Section, Colonial Office for repetition  
to Aden].



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1947

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65  
E 2143

PALESTINE

12 MAR

Registry  
Number

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Dated

Received  
in Registry

E 2143/951/31

Ltr. 14. Horehauer

Beir.

Bagdad.

216

8. Mar 1947

12

Palestine, Reference to U.N.O.

Refer F.O. Ltr 204 (E1818/951/31) Grogg  
Minister for Foreign Affairs called to ask  
for our support for proposal that an Arab  
State should be represented on a committee  
which to closely covers the Arabs and that  
Grogg should be that State since he is  
already a member of Trusteeship Committee.

Last Paper.

2142

References.

(Minutes.)

U.N. Dpt. <sup>SW G</sup> 1073

H. Beasley 12/3

We might defer a reply until  
we know in J.E. or in M.T. or  
to set up a Committee.

Bring up March 20.

Wm 13/3

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

|            |     |
|------------|-----|
| 24, Bagdad | 293 |
| Rtd. Cairo | 705 |
| Jedda      | 176 |
| Beirut     | 235 |
| Damascus   | 189 |
| Amman      | 147 |
| Terradon   |     |
| BMAO       | 345 |
| Amrit.     |     |

~~6.0.0.0.0~~  
Draft submitted.

H. Beasley 1/4

Wm 1/4

(Action  
completed.)

(Index)

GCP 1/4 24/8/48  
24/8/48

Next Paper.

E2268

32003 F.O.P.

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12 MAR

**Cypher/OTP**

FROM BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

8th March 1947.

R. 8.55 a.m. 10th March 1947

Beirut (please pass to Damascus as my telegram No. 23),

Jedda,  
Jerusalem,  
Amman,

**New York (U.K. Delegation)**

YYYYYY

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs called on me today to ask for our support for proposal that an Arab State should be represented on a Committee which so closely concerns the Arabs and that Iraq should be that State since she is already a member of Trusteeship Committee.

2.

K4

[Repeated to Amman and United Kingdom  
Delegation New York].

FO 371/61874

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FO 371 / 61874



~~normal way~~  
[Caris only] Please pass  
B.M.E.O. as my tel. NO. 345. mm 1/4

~~normal way~~  
[Caris only] Please pass  
BMEQ. as my tel. NO. 345.

68

FO 371 61874

OUT-FILE

69

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

E 2143/951/31

Cypher OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO BAGDAD

No. 293

1st April 1947.

D. 2.55 p.m. 2nd April 1947.

Repeated to Cairo No. 705  
Jedda No. 176  
Beirut No. 235  
Damascus No. 189  
Amman No. 117  
Jerusalem  
B.M.E.O. Cairo No. 345

TTTTTT

Your telegram No. 216, and my telegram to Cairo No. 667  
[Palestine and the United Nations]

The Secretary-General of the United Nations has now agreed that the Preparatory Committee on Palestine should be appointed by a special session of the General Assembly convened for the purpose. The United States and Soviet Governments have concurred in this procedure. The Secretariat are awaiting replies from the Chinese and French. When these are received, Sir A. Cadogan will present his request

(a) that Palestine shall be placed on the Agenda of the General Assembly at its September session, and

(b) that a special session shall be convened as soon as possible in order to constitute the Preparatory Committee and determine its terms of reference.

2. The composition of the Committee will thus be determined by the General Assembly at its special session.

[Cairo only]

Please pass B.M.E.O. as my telegram No. 345.

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32003 F.O.P.

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EXTRACT FROM THE "EGYPTIAN MAIL"  
- DATED 28th February, 1947.

## 'ARAB LEAGUE SUPPORTS BEVIN'

BY E. RAFFOUL  
'Mail' Political Reporter

THE Arab League fully supports Mr. Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, in his statement that U.S. policy concerning the Palestine question was harmful to all parties in the dispute, and contributed to the failure of the Palestine Conference in London.

This was stated to me in an exclusive interview yesterday by Abdel Rahman Azzam Pasha, Secretary-General of the Arab League, at Mr. Bevin's invitation of American policy.

"We have all felt," he told me, "that American policy, although actuated by honest and humanitarian principles, resulted in making the Palestine question even more difficult to solve."

"By backing up the Jews, the American Government has encouraged terrorism and violence in Palestine, and has made the Zionists even more intransigent in their demands."

"It is time that the Jewish world problem be separated once and for all from the Palestine question. The two questions are two separate subjects which should be treated accordingly."

"The Jewish world problem must be dealt with on an international and humanitarian basis, and the Arab World is large measure to the solution of the problem. The Palestine question, on the other hand, which is caused by the Zionist aggressive object of creating a Jewish National State concerns mainly the Palestinian people themselves."

"We will not tolerate the fact that the Jewish people's distress be exploited to forward a political, imperialist, and alien immigration into Palestine planned to secure political power in the whole Middle East."

Speaking on the British Government's decision to take the Palestine question to UNO, Azzam Pasha said that it was possible that the Arab States would appeal to UNO at one and the same time. The matter would be considered during the coming Arab League session on March 17, he said.

However, he added, it was not important who submits the case as long as the question is brought up for international consideration on suggestions of possible Arab-Jewish strife, Azzam Pasha said:

"Of what use would UNO and civilisation be to the world, if every dispute would be solved by violence," he exclaimed. "Arabs are very far from wishing to fight their cousins, the Jews, especially in a period of history when Jews have suffered oppression and persecution. Peaceful means and reason are the best means to solve the problem."

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Reference: FO 371/61874

16

1947

E

PALESTINE

E 2438

20 MAR

Registry  
Number

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Dated

Received  
in Registry

E 2438/957/31

Sir O. Kirkbride

Amman.

88

17.11.1947

20

Palestine ad hoc Committee.  
 State Transjordan P.M. has shown Sir O. Kirkbride  
 communications which he has received from  
 Egyptian and Iraqi fronts asking him to join  
 them in opposition to the appointment of committee  
 by U.N. undertake preparatory work  
 to Palestine question going to U.N. Sir O. Kirkbride  
 pointed out that delay was reckoned to be detrimental  
 to Arabs. Land committee may help.

Last Paper.

2268

References.

(Minutes.)

This should be given Ref. no. 2  
 distribution.

Copy to  
 ... ..

HB. 207

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8/80.

Mar 21

(Action  
completed.)

(Index.)

PM/217

24/8/48

Next Paper.

E 2452

32003 F.O.P.

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20 MAY

Cypher/OTP

## DISTRIBUTION

Sir A. Kirkbride  
No: 88

D. 6.0.p.m.17th March 1947

17th March 1947

R.10.5.p.m.17th March 1947

Repeated to Bagdad Saving

Beirut

Cairo

Damascus "

Ječda

British Middle East Office Cairo, Saving  
Jerusalem Saving

Secret.

Palestine.

Prime Minister of Transjordan has shown me communications which he has received from Egyptian and Iraqi Governments asking him to join them in opposition to the appointment by United Nations of a committee to undertake preparation work prior to the question of Palestine going before the General Assembly. He asked my advice. I pointed out that delay in a settlement of the Palestine question was always said to work to the detriment of the Arabs through continued Jewish immigration and alienation of Arab lands.

2. If this was true the Iraqi and Egyptian attitude was mistaken as it was probable that the work which could be undertaken by the Committee before the Assembly, might have to be done after [grp.undec ? Assembly] before a decision was reached.

3. Prime Minister was impressed by the point and said that he would bring it to the notice of Egypt and Iraq.

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**reference:-**

FO 371 / 61874

A circular postmark from Mannheim, dated 20. VII. 1914. The text "MANNHEIM" is at the top, and "20. VII. 1914" is at the bottom. In the center is a small emblem of a bird, possibly a phoenix or a similar mythical creature, standing on a base.

**PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE**

Group..... *FO*

Class ..... *371*

Piece ..... *61874*

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transferred to PRO Safe Room\*

*E2452/951/31*

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\*delete as necessary

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61874**



18

E

E 2402

21 MAR

1947

PALESTINE

Registry Number

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Dated

Received in Registry

E 2462/951/31

Lt. A Kirkbride  
Amman.

95.  
20, MAR 1947  
21 - -

Last Paper.

2452

References.

File 1914

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8.60 on E 2463

MAR 22

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

9/11/24/3

24/19/48

Next Paper.

2490

Palestine Arab League Meeting.  
Refer Amman letter 5/858/46 (E 2452/951/31)  
State Trans Jordan P.M. has proceeded to Cairo  
at urgent request of delegate to meeting of Board  
of Arab League to deal with proposal by Egypt  
and America of economic reprisals by Arab States  
unless they modified policies in Palestine. P.M. stated  
Trans Jordan could not do much by such means, and  
would wish clear from League if necessary.

(Minutes.)

forward to C.O.  
m. High  
MAR 21

14.13.21/3

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Cypher/OTP

E 2462

2 MARK

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 2

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir A. Kirkbride  
No. 25

D. 1.20 p.m. 20th March, 1947.

20th March, 1947.

R. 5.30 p.m. 20th March, 1947.

Repeated to : Bagdad No. 15 )  
Beirut No. 20 ) Foreign Office  
Cairo No. 29 )  
Damascus No. 19 ) please repeat  
Jedda No. 16 )  
British Middle East )  
Office, Cairo No. 15 )  
Jerusalem No. 26 SAVING

IMMEDIATE  
SECRET

MMMMMM

PALESTINE AND ARAB LEAGUE


The Prime Minister of Transjordan has proceeded to Cairo at the urgent request of [gp.under.] delegate to the meeting of Council of the Arab League in order to deal with a proposal made by the Iraqi delegation to the effect that the League should warn the governments of Great Britain and America of economic reprisals by the Arab States unless those two governments modify their policies regarding Palestine.

Before leaving the Prime Minister told me that it would be impossible for Transjordan to be party to such a measure and that, if necessary, he would withdraw from the League on that issue.

See my demi-official letter S/85B/46, March 12th, in this connexion.

E 2462 / 911 / 31

[Repeated to Bagdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda, and British Middle East Office, Cairo.]



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78

*British...Embassy,.....*

.....Bagdad.....

F 2490

29 10/1/68

13th March, 1947.....

*Reference to previous correspondence :*

*Description of Enclosure.*

Name and Date.

**Subject.**

Translation copy of  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Note Verbale No. 237/237/13  
dated 11th March, 1947 and  
text of telegram despatched  
to Secretary General United  
Nations Organization.

## Palestine Question

3479 20941 (4)

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Reference: **FO 371/61874**

79

Translation.

No. 237/23/13

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Bagdad, 11th March, 1947

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs present their compliments to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, Bagdad, and have the honour to enclose herewith, for favour of transmission to its Government, the text of a telegram despatched by His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs on 10th March to the Secretary-General, United Nations Organisation, concerning the question of Palestine.

The Ministry avail themselves of the opportunity to express their highest consideration and esteem,

His Britannic Majesty's Embassy,  
Bagdad.

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Reference: **FO 371/61874**

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80  
Mr Trygve Lie

Secretary-General

United Nations

New York

Statements have appeared in the press that you contemplate the setting up of a committee to study the Palestine question when the matter is submitted by the British Government to the United Nations Stop It is our considered opinion that the Palestine question need no further study by any new committee for it has been studied by several British Commissions and Committees Stop We cannot imagine that another committee can find out anything new or unknown Stop The British Government had issued before the last world war three white papers on Palestine the last of which was the white paper of 1939 which was the outcome of experience and trial of twenty years Stop It was as fair and impartial to both Arabs and Jews as possible and was drafted by a British Ministerial Committee including some fair and impartial personalities like the late Mr. Chamberlain Lord Halifax and Mr. Macdonald Stop The Arabs after refusing this white paper did their utmost to compromise during this last war in accepting its main principles and objects Stop It is most important to point out that the setting up of a new committee may be considered by neutral observers as favouring the Zionists Stop Moreover it may prove to be a dangerous precedent in procedure which may shake international confidence in the impartiality and justice of the United Nations Stop Shall be grateful to receive your views on the matter.

M.F. TAMALI

Minister of Foreign Affairs for  
Iraq.

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1947

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E 2533

81

24 MAR

PALESTINE

Registry  
Number } E 2533/957/51.

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Sir R. Bannett.

Dated

Paris ? 751.

Received  
in Registry }

757

22 MAR 1947

24 - -

Palestine, and United Nations.

In conversation with Oriental M. L. G. Mr. G. L. G. said that question was being discussed whether or not Arab States should themselves refer Palestine case to U.N. or whether they should merely refer case on reference of Britain. Transjordan M. L. G. subsequently told Oriental M. L. G. that it had now been decided that the Arab States should not themselves refer Palestine to U.N. However further information is being awaited.

Last Paper.

2490

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Del. Cairo 667.  
Hq. Baghdad 275  
Beirut 219  
Damascus 175  
Tel. 167  
Amman 185  
Jerusalem  
CMK 209  
Mar 26.

(Action  
completed)

(Index.)

Next Paper.

E 2614

32008 F.O.P.

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82

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

D. 3.03 p.m. March 22nd, 1947.  
R. 7.30 p.m. March 22nd, 1947.

E 2573  
24 MAR

SSSSS

EIGHT

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### References:-

FO 371 61874

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3. Sheik Youssef Yassin told the Oriental Minister that at the meetings of the Council regarding Palestine the delegates had greatly praised your attitude at the Palestine conference in London.

24 MAR 1947

Damascus please pass to Beirut as my telegram  
No. [grp. undec.]



Registry  
No.E 2533/951/31

OUT FILE

FOREIGN OFFICE  
S.W.I.

H.B.

27 March, 1947.

IMMEDIATE, SECRET

*Despatched* M.

Draft.

IMMEDIATE, SECRET

Cairo

Your telegram No. 757 [Palestine and  
the United Nations]

Telegram.

No.

Date.

Cypher

Departmental No 2

The present position is as follows.

Sir Alexander Cadogan has been authorised to  
request the Secretary General to the United  
Nations to place the question of Palestine  
on the Agenda of the General Assembly at its  
September Session. He is to <sup>state that H.M.G.</sup> ~~promise an~~

Repeat to:

✓ Bagdad 275  
✓ Beirut 219  
✓ Damascus 175  
✓ \* Jeddah 193  
✓ Jerusalem  
[B.M.E.C.]

~~will submit an~~ account of the administration of Palestine

under the present Mandate, and ~~is to state that~~

~~His Majesty's Government~~ will ask the Assembly  
to make recommendations concerning the future  
government of Palestine."

2. This request has not yet been formally  
communicated to the Secretary General. ) We  
are anxious that some preparatory work on the  
problem shall be done by the United Nations  
before the September session. Without this,  
we fear that the Assembly would probably do  
little more than appoint a Committee to  
investigate the problem and report back in  
1948. Conversations are now proceeding in  
New York as to procedure during this  
preparatory stage. The Secretary General  
wishes to seek the approval of the member  
States for the appointment of a Committee by  
his authority. Our own original idea, which  
the State Department are still inclined to

/favour...

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

see end of file

U.N. D.P.N. 25/3

H.B. 24/3

100/25/3

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Reference: FO 371 61874

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favour, was that the Committee should be appointed by a special Session of the General Assembly convened for the purpose. We are prepared to accept whichever of these two procedures meets with general agreement.

3. Our request for consideration of the Palestine problem by the United Nations will probably not be submitted to the Secretary General until this question of preparatory procedure has been cleared up informally.

4. The above may be communicated unofficially to the Iraqi Foreign Minister and to any other Arab Delegates who may ask to be informed of our intentions.

[bairo] - please pass copy to  
RV  
2573 BMEC as my  
tel no. 309

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Reference:

FO 371/61874

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85

**Secret**

DEPARTMENTAL No. 2

No. 667

D. 12.15 a.m. 27th March 1947.

Repeated to Bagdad No. 275  
Beirut No. 219  
Damascus No. 175  
Jedda No. 167  
Amman No. 135  
Jerusalem  
B.M.E.O. Cairo No. 309

rrrrrr

Your telegram No. 757 [Palestine and the United Nations].

The present position is as follows.

Sir Alexander Cadogan has been authorised to request the Secretary-General to the United Nations to place the question of Palestine on the Agenda of the General Assembly at its September Session. He is to state that His Majesty's Government will submit an account of the administration of Palestine under the present Mandate, and will ask the Assembly "to make recommendations concerning the future government of Palestine".

2. This request has not yet been formally communicated to the Secretary-General. We are anxious that some preparatory work on the problem shall be done by the United Nations before the September Session. Without this, we fear that the Assembly would probably do little more than appoint a Committee to investigate the problem and report back in 1948. Conversations are now proceeding in New York as to procedure during this preparatory stage. The Secretary-General wishes to seek the approval of the member States for the appointment of a Committee by his authority. Our own original idea, which the State Department are still inclined to favour, was that the Committee should be appointed by a special Session of the General Assembly convened for the purpose. We are prepared to accept whichever of these two procedures meets with general agreement.

3.

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Reference: **FO 371/61874**

Please pass copy to British Middle East Office as my telegram No. 309.

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87  
E 2614

1947

PALESTINE

26 MAR

Registry  
Number

E 2614/957/31.

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Sir R. Campbell.

Dated

Cairo

Received  
in Registry

773

25 Mar 1947

26

Arab League Meeting.

Refer Cairo Tel 761 (T 1281/12/16). Council  
of League of Arab States held its 26th mtg  
24 March under presidency of yourself  
in Addis. Council examined Palestinian  
question and unanimously took following  
decisions. Given List.

Last Paper.

2533

References.

(Minutes.)

Egyptian Rep. (last para.)

Thank you. We have also  
entered a copy of this J.

N.R. Oakeshott 29/2

H.B. 28/3

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action  
completed.)

CSM/51/3

(Index.)

24/4/48

Next Paper.

26/6

32003 F.O.P.

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Reference:

FO 371/61874

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[En clair]

### GENERAL DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir R.I. Campbell.  
No. 773.

D. 11.15 a.m. 25th March, 1947.

R. 2.15 p.m. 25th March, 1947.

25th March, 1947.

Repeated to Bagdad,  
Beirut,  
Jerusalem,  
Jedda,  
Damascus,  
Amman.

**IMPORTANT.**

LIGHT.

### Arab League Meeting.

My telegram No.761.

Following is text of communiqué issued by Arab League Council March 24th.

[ Begins ]

Council of League of Arab States held its 46th Meeting  
24th March under presidency of Youssef Yassin. Council  
examined Palestinian question and unanimously took following decisions.

1. Since negotiations which have recently taken place with Great Britain at Palestine Conference in London have not resulted in an equitable solution and since British Government have subsequently announced that they would submit question to United Nations, the Council decides that Arab States should defend that cause by all means in their power before international organisation on basis of independence of Palestine.

2. Council decide to establish Committee to take all necessary measures in the course of defence of Palestinian cause by Arab States.

3. Council recommends to Governments of Arab States that they should provide Higher Arab Committee with necessary funds to intensify propaganda for Palestinian cause before world public opinion and to provide it also with necessary funds to send Palestinian Scholastic Missions to specialise in science and arts with view to creation of University of Science and Arts in Palestine.

4. Council expresses its lively opposition to continuation of Zionist immigration whether authorised by Great Britain or illegal and demand that it should be immediately and totally stopped. It expresses its protest against weakness of measures taken by Great Britain to combat that immigration.

/Council



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Reference: **FO 371** **61874**

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- 2 -

? Libya

Council subsequently examined question of [Tripolitania] and took following decision thereon.

Council maintains its previous decision relation to unity and independence of that country. It charges Secretary General to make representations in order that Arab League or certain Arab countries may participate in any enquiry or plebiscite destined to determine political status of that country. It charges Secretary General to watch situation in country from the point of view of famine which threatens it in order that if circumstances become critical Secretary General may place himself in touch with Arab countries so that they may do what is necessary in that connexion. [Ends].

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FO 371/61874

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The resolution is, incidentally, anti-British in tone, seeing that point ① criticises us, point ② calls for economic sanctions against us and ③ calls for the continuation of a policy against which we have protested.

I think that in due course we should instruct Sir H. Clancher, kind to let the Iraqis know that the terms of the resolution have caused us some surprise. I suggest, however, that we wait a few days to see whether reactions in Cairo affect the action to be taken.

B.O. March 31st

R. G. G. arnan  
28/3  
J. M. J. 28/3

In pp. Amended 281. 25/3

In P.P. State Dept. at 1392 at 28 to  
American Embassy, London

Jan 24/4

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FROM BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

D. 3.09 p.m. 25th March 1947.

25th March 1947. R. 7.18 p.m. 25th March 1947.

Repeated to Cairo  
Beirut  
Damascus  
Jedda  
Amman  
Jerusalem  
British Middle East Office Cairo

TTTTT

My immediately preceding telegram.

**Arab League.**

Government yesterday took unprecedented step of summoning a joint meeting of both Houses of Parliament. The proceedings which lasted four hours were followed by the Regent from the Royal Gallery. First in secret session the Prime Minister read out the resolutions of the Bludan Conference. Then in open debate a number of speakers criticised the Arab League for its inefficiency, lack of unity and neglect of the Palestine question.

2. Finally a resolution was adopted requiring the League unanimously to approve the following action: United Kingdom and United States to be informed that they are responsible for the present critical state of affairs in Palestine.

(2) Arabs should go to U.N.O. and demand the setting up of independent Arab State in Palestine. If demand is not met Bludan decisions to be implemented, including reconsideration of economic and political relations with the United Kingdom and United States.

(3) Full boycott of Zionist goods including transit trade to prevent raw materials reaching the Zionists.

3. If the resolution is not adopted by the League Iraq will consider herself free of all responsibility in the matter.

4. This resolution was telegraphed to Janali yesterday. The proviso in telegram is meant to hint, Nuri told me this morning, that either the League must take Iraq's views into serious consideration or Iraq

**must**

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„jelele“

FO 371/61874



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- 2 -

must "suspend her membership" or even withdraw altogether. Iraq could not continue to be dragged along at the heels of Azam and Egypt in their use of the League merely as an instrument for furthering Egyptian aspirations rather than genuine Arab interests and still retain her self-respect as an independent sovereign State.

Beirut please pass to Damascus as my telegram No. 32 and Foreign Office please pass to Amman as my telegram No. 21.

[Repeated to Amman].

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94

AMENDMENT SLIP

GENERAL DISTRIBUTION

Bagdad telegram No.281 to Foreign Office of 25th March.

Paragraph 4. line 2.

For "telegram" please read "tail".

223. 28/3

Communication Department.  
27th March, 1947.

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|---------|-----|----|
| INDEXED |     |    |
| 26/6    | 957 | 21 |

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Reference: **FO 371/61874**

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RECD: 3:49A/29  
TYPED: 5:05A/29  
DS

C L E A R

FROM: THE DEPARTMENT  
TO: AMEMBASSY LONDON  
NR: 1392, MARCH 28, 1947

Following from Baghdad repeated for your information:  
"No. 121, 25th.

New Iraqi Parliament in special Joint Session attended  
throughout by Regent, passed following Resolution yesterday:

"Whereas the British Government's policy since the  
Balfour Declaration is directly responsible for the disturbed  
conditions in Palestine and the untoward circumstances re-  
sulting therefrom which threaten peace and security in this  
part of the world and endanger the existence of the Arabs  
and whereas strong Zionist pressure has induced the American  
Government to interfere in this question and to influence the  
British Government to favor the Zionists and in view of the  
direct and indirect influence of the 2 countries in the United  
Nations, apart from the great Zionist influence in world finan-  
cial markets, the Iraqi Parliament does not see any assurance  
for the realization of even a part of the just Arab cause im-  
bodied in the White Papers issued by the British Government  
during the last 20 years and especially in the last White Paper  
issued in 1939 on the basis of 20 years experience.

"In view of the foregoing, the Iraqi Parliament proposed,  
in order to assure the rights of the Arabs in Palestine, that  
the following decision be adopted unanimously by the Arab League  
States:

"1. To notify/

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"1. To notify the British and American Governments that they are responsible for the present circumstances prevailing in Palestine and the consequent dangers which threaten peace and security in this part of the world.

2. To request the United Nations to declare Palestine an independent Arab State. If this is not done by the United Nations, the Arab League States will find themselves compelled to implement the Secret Resolutions taken at the Extraordinary Session in Bludan which provide among other things, for the reconsideration by all the Arab League States of their economic and political relations with the British and American Governments.

3. To prohibit the export of raw materials which feed Zionist industries whether locally produced or in transit to Palestine in addition to strictly boycotting the import of Zionist goods.

"The Iraqi Parliament avows its adherence to these proposals and exonerates Iraq from the responsibility for any consequences arising from failure to implement them."

According to competent reporter present, veteran Shia, Senator Ridha Shabibis unseconded request for time to study Resolution "lest it be interpreted that Iraq wished to withdraw from League" was quickly quashed by Prime Minister's answer, "We either execute the Bludan Resolutions resolutely or we hesitate to do so. Blame must rest on those who hesitate if the League does not give the Palestine Question the serious consideration it merits and does not adopt a decisive attitude upon the basis of the Bludan Resolutions. Then let there be no League." Among other interesting statements made during session

were those/

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page -3-

were those of Arshad Al Umari who said, "Other Arab States regard Palestine as important, but not above national issues. We place Palestine even before our Iraqi issues because the fate of all Arabs will be determined in Palestine" and Senator Sadiq Bassam who stated, "I understand that the Arab League has decided to entertain a proposal to abandon the Secret Bludan Resolutions. Iraq, therefore, should adopt a plan compatible with its traditional Palestine Policy. The Prime Minister expounded such a plan in our Secret Session (1st half hour of session was in camera to permit Nuri to disclose various secret documents). As you recall, it embodied 6 Articles of the Bludan Resolutions. If these proposals are adopted, Palestine will be saved."

Session concluded with passage of Nuri's proposal to appoint Delegation carry copy of joint Resolution to Arab League Meeting. Text of Resolution cabled Foreign Minister Jamali in Cairo.

Copies to Arab Capitals."

ACHESON ACTING

MR. JONES

THE AMBASSADOR

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23

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E 2638

98

1947

PALESTINE

26

Registry  
Number

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Dated

Received  
in Registry

E 2638/957/21

R. R. Campbell

Paris

780

25 Mar 1947  
26 - -

Arab League and Palestine.

Refer Baghdad to L.O. at no. 2804 (T1360/12/5).  
 Check yourself. Yaffin stated that Iraqi Govt  
 had indicated that it proposed to Arab League  
 that Arab States should not go to U.N. but  
 should demand from America and England execution  
 of white paper. Failing which Arab State  
 would retaliate against oil etc.

Last Paper.

2616

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)


8/6/47

Mar. 29

(Action  
completed.)

(Index.)

J. L. M. 21/3

  
 [Signature]  
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Next Paper.

E 2733

32003 F.O.P.

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26 Nov

Cypher/OTP

## GENERAL DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO BAHAD

Sir R. Campbell  
No. 88

D. 7.49 p.m. 25th March, 1947.

25th March, 1947.

R. 9.15 a.m. 26th March. 1947.

Repeated to : FOREIGN OFFICE NO. 780

Beirut

**DAMASCUS**

Jedda

Jerusalem

Amman - Saving

IMPORTANT

## MEMORANDUM

Your telegram No. 274 to Foreign Office.

issue.

Sheik Youssef Yassin informed the Oriental Minister a few days ago that the Iraqi Government had instructed its delegation to propose to the Arab League that the Arab States should not go to United Nations over the Palestine question but should demand from America and England the execution of White Paper, failing which the Arab States would retaliate against oil, civil aviation and other Anglo-Saxon interests in their countries. Jamali also mentioned the proposal to the Oriental Minister (see paragraph 4 of my telegram No. 751).

2. Azzam, who also acquainted the Oriental Minister with this proposal, said he had argued that if such a Note were addressed to America and England they would only refer the matter to United Nations which could not be disregarded now that the Palestine question generally had been referred to it. He asked the opinion of the Oriental Minister who said he did not think that there was any advantage to the Arabs in threatening the Anglo-Saxon Powers in this way on the eve of discussion of the Palestine question by United Nations. Surely he suggested there were other and milder ways of making the Americans understand that their economic interests in the Middle East were not best served by policies distasteful to the Arabs.

3.



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Damascus please pass to Beirut as my telegram No. 99.

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61874**

Wt 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.I.



E. 2853

3 APR

Dear Harold,

I enclose a telegram the Secretary of State has had from the Arab Higher Committee. We should be grateful if you would take any action on it which you may think is necessary.

Yours ever,

John

Harold Beeley, Esq., C.B.E.,  
Eastern Department,  
FOREIGN OFFICE.

FO 371 61874



МИНИСТЕРСТВО СВЯЗИ СССР  
ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВЕННАЯ

ЦЕНТРАЛЬНЫЙ ТЕЛЕГРАФ г. МОСКВА

|                                       |        |                                      |
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| Служ. отметки:                        |        |                                      |

Адрес:

MISTER BEVIN

BRITISH FOREIGN

SECRETARY

MOSCOW -

TO THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
USA FOREIGN SECRETARY MISTER MOLLOTOV USSR FOREIGN SECRETARY  
MISTER BIDAULT FRENCH FOREIGN SECRETARY - M O S C O W -  
THE ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE REPRESENTING PALESTINE ARABS DRAWS YOUR  
ATTENTION TO CONTINUED INJUSTICE BEFALLING ARABS DUE ANGLO JEWISH  
POLICY AIMING CREATION POLITICAL STATUS FOR JEWS ON RELIGIOUS -

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# МИНИСТЕРСТВО СВЯЗИ СССР ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВЕННАЯ

ЦЕНТРАЛЬНЫЙ ТЕЛЕГРАФ г. МОСКВА

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| Из <b>PAGE 2 NR 70 TM4 26/3</b>     |               |                        |        |
| № ____ сл. ____ го. ____ ч. ____ м. |               |                        |        |
| Служ. отметки:                      |               |                        |        |

AND RACIAL BASIS AND DISLOCATION ARABS THE LEGAL OWNERS AND THEIR  
REPLACEMENT BY FOREIGNERS AND DENYING ARABS THEIR RIGHTS AND  
RESOURCES IN UNPRECEDENTED MANNER STOP PALESTINE IS COUNTRY OF  
ARABS FOR TENS OF CENTURIES AND ARAB CASE BASED ON JUST PRINCIPLES  
AIMING ESTABLISHMENT DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT STOP JEWS NOW ENDEAVOUR  
TRANSFORM -

104

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 ТВО СВЯЗИ СССР  
 ИТЕЛЬСТВЕННАЯ

ЦЕНТРАЛЬНЫЙ ТЕЛЕГРАФ г. МОСКВА

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| № _____ сл. _____ го. _____ ч. _____ м. |                             |
| Служ. отметки: _____                    |                             |

Адрес: \_\_\_\_\_

PALESTINE TO COUNTRY OF JEWISH MAJORITY RESORTING TO MEANS OF  
 TERRORISM DECEIT AND BREAKING LAWS STOP PREVALENCE PRESENT  
 CONDITIONS WILL CREATE PROBLEMS AND CONTINUED DISTURBANCES THROUGHOUT  
 MIDDLE EAST STOP ANY SOLUTION PALESTINE PROBLEM INCOMPATIBLE ARAB  
 RIGHTS AND PREVENTING THEM ENJOY INDEPENDENCE AND RESULTS CONTINUATION  
 JEWISH IMMIGRATION CONSTITUTES DEFINITE INJUSTICE AND  
 WILL NEVER BE ACCEPTED BY ARAB S - ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE +

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26

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E 2876

106

1947

PALESTINE

3 APR

Registry  
Number

E 2876/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Sir R. Campbell  
Cairo

Dated

Received  
in Registry

833

1 April 1947  
3

Political. Iraqi Resolutions.

Appt. Bagdad till 281 (E 2016/951/31)  
Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs told Inayat  
that Council of Arab League had  
accepted Iraqi Resolutions. He added that the  
Council had been much impressed by the  
attitude of Iraqi Parliament.

Last Paper.

285-3

References.

(Minutes.)

This is puzzling. Our accounts of  
the resolutions passed, (a) in the Iraqi  
Parliament and (b) at the Council of the  
Arab League, do not tally.

H. Beasley 4/4

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Ref. Cairo 771  
Ref. Bagdad 321.  
Beirut 258  
Damascus 209.  
Iddla 191  
Amman 164  
April 12.

(Action  
completed.)

G.D.B. 8/4 24/8/48

(Index)

24/8/48

Next Paper.

E 2890

32003 F.O.P.

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Registry  
No:

E2876/951/31

OUT FILE

108

Draft. telegram  
to R. Campbell  
Cairo

No 771

April 12<sup>th</sup>

by press

Repeat Baghdad 321.  
Beirut 358.  
Damascus 209.  
Hadda 191.  
~~Amman~~  
Amman 164.

General Dist.

WJ 10/4

Your telegrams Nos 814 and  
833 [of March 29 and April 1.  
Meeting of Arab League].

We understand that  
Iraqi representative did not  
press his original proposal  
for retaliation against  
Anglo-Saxon interests, but  
was instructed to put forward  
to the Arab League "another  
version" of <sup>Iraqi</sup> ~~the~~ proposal.  
Iraqi representative asserts  
that the Arab League  
accepted Iraqi resolutions,  
presumably the revised version.  
Can you ascertain whether  
any such resolutions were in  
fact accepted by Arab League  
and if so their exact  
terms?

WJ 10/4

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO.

No. 771.

D. 12.15 p.m. 13th April, 1947.

12th April, 1947.

Repeated to Bagdad, 321.  
Beirut, 258.  
Damascus, 209.  
Jedda, 191.  
Amman, 164.

5 5 5 5

Your telegrams No's. 814 and 833 [of March 29 and April 1, Meeting of Arab league].

We understand that Iraqi representative did not Anglo-Saxon interests, but was instructed to put forward to the Arab league "another version" of Iraqi proposal. Iraqi representative asserts that the Arab league accepted Iraqi resolutions, presumably the revised version. Can you ascertain whether any such resolutions were in fact accepted by Arab league and if so their exact terms?

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1947

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E 2890

110

PALESTINE

5 APR

Registry  
Number

TELEGRAM FROM

Mr. Houston Boswell

No.

BERUT

Dated

254

Received  
in Registry

2 Apr 47

Arab League views on Palestine.

In speech to Lebanese Chamber of Deputies on 1 Apr Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that Arab League were determined to pursue Palestine question at U.N with all means at their disposal. Resolution supporting this was passed by the Chamber. Discusses also Syrian-Lebanese mediation in Anglo-Egyptian dispute. Repted ME posts.

Last Paper.

E2876

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

HB. 12/4

(Action  
completed.)

(Index.)

Next Paper.

E2876

Reference:

FO 371/61874

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E 2890

APR

En Clair

GENERAL DISTRIBUTION

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Houstoun Boswall D. 2.30 p.m. 3rd April, 1947  
No. 254  
2nd April, 1947. R. 8.20 a.m. 4th March, 1947

Repeated to Cairo  
Bagdad  
Jerusalem  
Amman  
Jedda  
Damascus Saving

0 0 0 0

1. In speech to Lebanese Chamber of Deputies on April 1st Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that complete unanimity had reigned at recent meeting of Arab League Council. Resolutions adopted were not improvisation but were result of Inchas meeting, Bludan Conference and serious study by Council. Arab League were determined to pursue Palestine question at U.N. with all means at their disposal and were confident that Arab Palestine would attain independence and freedom. As regards Syrian-Lebanese mediation in Anglo Egyptian dispute, Minister for Foreign Affairs said Syria and Lebanon had been unable to take negative stand in controversy between Egypt and Great Britain. They had been actuated by duty imposed by true friendship and by obligations resulting from their international position as members of Arab League and United Nations. If attempt failed it at least showed desire of country and Government to facilitate just solution of Egypt's problem. He concluded, "now that Egypt had decided to refer case to U.N., Arab League has adopted resolution lending unlimited support."

2. Following resolution was adopted unanimously by Chamber at same meeting. Lebanese Chamber of Deputies reaffirmed collaboration of Lebanese State and people with all other Arab States in defence of Palestine and supports Government in their endeavours to that end. Chamber begs Government not to abandon efforts until independence of Palestine is accomplished fact, regardless of stages through which question must pass before desired objective is obtained. Chamber also supports Egypt in her national demands

3. Last sentence was not part of resolution as originally submitted by three private members, but was added in course of debate.

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### Minutes.

Mr. Howe,

✓ The annexed ~~memo~~ memorandum by the General ~~has been prepared~~ <sup>will be useful</sup> in case we are suddenly asked to produce a paper showing what the F.D. think will be the result of pursuing a Palestine policy unacceptable to the Arabs.

You may wish to consider whether it might be useful to submit it, or to amend it, at the present stage.

Wm. W. W.

123456

12

Reference:-

FO 371 61874

8 APR

I am very much concerned at the possible serious political consequences for His Majesty's Government of a solution of the Palestine question unacceptable to the Arabs and I have attempted in this memorandum an estimate of what these consequences would be.

2. While it is impossible to predict with certainty, owing to the many divergent trends of thought in the Arab world, just how unfavourable a solution the general mass of the Arabs can be brought to accept, it can be assumed that the Arabs would regard as unacceptable any solution which, in their view, does not contain an adequate guarantee of security against future Jewish demands for increased territory or increased power and influence:- for example, any form of partition with its implication of unlimited immigration and a consequent future demand for increased "Lebensraum" would be unacceptable to the Arabs (even if backed by assurances of the immutability of the frontiers of the Jewish state), or again any unitary solution which permitted immigration on a scale which would ultimately threaten Arab preponderance in Palestine.

3. The reactions of the Arabs in Palestine itself to any such solution are fairly easy to predict; these would be the most violent protests and an outbreak of Arab terrorism, probably on a serious scale, accompanied by disturbances and strikes. These would, indeed, constitute primarily a police problem, but they would have important political implications, deriving principally from the general sympathy and support which the Palestinian Arabs would enjoy in the other Arab countries (involving the supply of arms etc. from the neighbouring countries). But more important than this we must consider also the reactions of all the Arab countries of the Middle East, countries in varying stages of social and economic development, and the effect of these reactions on the position of His Majesty's Government in these countries and on the whole position of His Majesty's Government in the Middle East. We must indeed go further and consider the consequent repercussions on His Majesty's Government's relations with other powers and in particular with Soviet Russia.

4. Some of the Arab countries are still in a primitive stage of development, where the King is an autocrat and only his views and opinions need to be taken into account. That is the case with Saudi Arabia, the Yemen, Transjordan and the Sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf area. Here the issue is comparatively simple and predictable:-

(a) In Saudi Arabia it is a question of what King Ibn Saud would think. He would be bitterly disappointed at what he would regard as a betrayal of the Arab race (in which he would feel personally involved on account of his advice to the Arabs in the early stages of the 1939-45 war to put their trust in Great Britain) and His Majesty's Government would have to expect in consequence to forfeit, at any rate for some time to come, that position of respect and influence which they have enjoyed for so long with Ibn Saud.

(b) In the Yemen we have no similar position of respect and influence. His Majesty's Government would lose prestige in Yemeni eyes but the local implications would not be serious for us.

(c)/

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Reference: **FO 371 61874**

(c) In Transjordan the reaction would probably be less violent for two reasons. In the first place, King Abdullah, for all his faults, is more wholeheartedly devoted to Great Britain than any other Arab ruler. Secondly his ambition leads him to hope that out of the solution of the Palestine question, if it is to be partition, may come some increase of his own territories.

(d) In the Sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf, - Koweit, Bahrein, Qatar and the Trucial Sheikdoms, the position of influence which His Majesty's Government enjoys with the local Sheikhs should be sufficient to counter any adverse reactions.

5. The position in the remaining Arab States, - the more "advanced" countries of Egypt, the Levant States and Iraq, - is much more complex and difficult. These countries in their several ways are groping towards some form of progressive and democratic government under the impulse of two separate but concurrent forces (a) the growing discontent and restlessness of the masses, aggravated in its turn by the social and economic dislocation resulting from the war and (b) the growth of local and Arab nationalism. This second factor is indeed closely connected with a third, namely the steady development and transformation of the Effendis, - the educated and semi-educated products of Eastern universities and schools, - into a coherent and vocal professional middle class destined, without a doubt, to play a leading part in shaping the future of the Middle Eastern countries. It is among these Effendis that the new spirit of nationalism finds expression in its most extreme form. The social economic and political evolution resulting from the inter-play of these forces is producing stresses and strains which are profoundly affecting the position which Great Britain has built up, particularly in Egypt and Iraq, over the last three-quarters of a century. The explanation of Egyptian and Iraqi demands for Treaty revision. The maintenance of our position in these countries (and particularly in Egypt) is moreover being prejudiced by the fact that the question of relations with Great Britain has become a dominating factor in internal politics and is being exploited as such by local politicians. It is in these circumstances an unfortunate fact that large sections of the Effendis in these countries are hostile and suspicious towards Great Britain. Indeed the extremist and revolutionary tendencies of some sections make them a potential prey to Soviet propaganda, which is already active throughout the Middle East. The objective of this propaganda is quite clearly not the immediate dissemination of Communist doctrine, but the undermining of Great Britain's position in the Middle East and the Soviet propaganda machine is losing no opportunity to exploit the difficulties of the situation to the full and, wherever possible, to turn the Arabs against Great Britain.

6. To meet such a situation His Majesty's Government are now pursuing a three-fold policy of (a) using their influence to encourage local governments (and particularly the Iraqi Government) to pursue a more enlightened policy taking due account of the evolutionary process towards more representative and democratic government. (b) encouraging by the offer of expert advice and assistance (through the British Middle East Office in Cairo) the development of improved labour conditions, improved methods of agriculture, improved health services etc. in short those factors which are essential to improvement in living standards and conditions, and (c) giving full publicity throughout the Middle East to the British way of life and its advantages over Russian communism.

7. It is against such a background that we must try to estimate the effect in these "advanced" Arab countries of a solution of the Palestine problem unacceptable to the Arabs, - to estimate, in

short, /

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short, the degree to which such a development would complicate still further the task of His Majesty's Government in maintaining their position in the Middle East.

8. (a) in Egypt, the growing spirit of nationalism is essentially local and Egyptian, rather than Arab, and in normal circumstances, a solution of the Palestine question unfavourable to the Arabs might not arouse strong feeling. There is however, a strong tendency to support the cause of the Palestine Arabs for prestige reasons, to justify Egypt's claim to be the leading Arab state of the Middle East. Passions have, moreover, been aroused in Egypt over the protracted treaty negotiations and unfriendly politicians are ready to exploit for their own purposes any issue which can be turned to the disadvantage of Great Britain. It must be expected that they would seize for this purpose on any unfavourable solution of the Palestine question.

(b) In the Levant States, Syria and the Lebanon (especially in the former), Arab feeling about Palestine is very strong, but here Great Britain does not enjoy the same position of influence as other Arab lands, for the reason that her association with these two countries has not been so close in the past. In the Levant States, an unfavourable solution of the Palestine question would provoke loud and vehement protests and the weak Governments in both countries would be likely, in self-defence, to join, and even take the lead, in the denunciation of Great Britain. It is moreover to be expected that any rising in Palestine would be organised and supplied from Syria.

(c) But it is in Iraq of all the Arab countries that feeling over Palestine runs highest and the tide of genuinely pan-Arab nationalism flows strongest. It is here that the reaction to a solution of the Palestine problem unfavourable to the Arabs would be most spontaneous and most violent, and the consequences to His Majesty's Government most serious. His Majesty's Government enjoy a special position in Iraq, based on special Treaty relations, which have grown out of our former position as mandatory power in Iraq after the first world war, and depending on the friendly feelings of the Regent of Iraq and the leading Iraqi politicians. But the Regent would not be able to stand up against an outburst of anti-British feeling over Palestine. The prospects of the impending negotiations for revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty would thereby be seriously prejudiced and it must be expected that in the face of pressure from public opinion the Iraqi Government would have to take steps to terminate the contracts of the various British advisers and experts in their employ. Moreover the Iraq Petroleum company anticipate that in such circumstances they would be faced with serious labour troubles (with a repetition on a much larger scale of the agitations which provoked the strike at the Kirkuk oilfields last July) as well as difficulties with the Iraqi authorities. Other British enterprises in Iraq would suffer similarly.

9. The conclusion to be drawn from this survey is that a solution of the Palestine question unacceptable to the Arabs would lead to a serious deterioration in our relations with the Arab countries in the Middle East (with relatively unimportant exceptions) and would cause a serious setback to our Middle East policy particularly in Iraq. We should, at one stroke, forfeit the confidence of the Arabs and particularly of the Effendis, who are, as explained above, becoming a very important element in the Arab countries. No doubt with time it would be possible to win back the confidence of the rulers of the primitive countries. The danger is, however that in the "advanced" countries events would move too fast to enable us to make up the ground that would have been lost, and that, in Iraq and the Levant States in particular, we should, by our own action, create the conditions which would make possible extensive Soviet penetration into these countries. Mr. Shone, in a report which he sent before he left Beirut on the subject of the decline

of/



10. These forebodings may appear unduly pessimistic, but I have felt bound to set them down, as I am deeply impressed by the precarious character of our present position in the Middle East. We need time and the most favourable conditions possible to establish our relationship with the Arab countries, particularly Egypt and Iraq, on a broader basis, more in accordance with the changing conditions in those countries, and I am anxious lest a decision be taken over Palestine which might nullify our whole endeavour in an area of great possibilities for British activity and initiative. This is an area of vital importance to Great Britain in which, in favourable conditions, we can stand up successfully to Soviet pressure and penetration, and it is surely essential that we should not take any action over Palestine which would handicap us out of the field.

R. J. Parman  
6/1/47

FO 371/61874

29

E

E 3096

118

PALESTINE

14 APR 1947

Registry Number } E3096/957/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Dated

Received in Registry

Sir R. Campbell

Paris

895

12 April 1947

118 - -

*Palestine and U.N.*  
*Sheikh Youssif Yassin called on President*  
*Minister on April 12 and urged desirability*  
*of understanding between U.N. and Saudi*  
*Arabia regarding coordinating reference to*  
*U.N. General Assembly of the Palestine Question.*  
*He also spoke to Egyptian U.S. of A. who*  
*suggested to urge U.N. desirability of understanding*

Last Paper.

2932

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

*Del Paris 794*  
*Rtd, Bagdad 1333*  
*Sadda 195*  
*Damascus 216*  
*Beirut 266*  
*Amman 173*  
*Jerusalem*  
*LMFO 397*  
*UKAed*  
*New York 1160*  
*(290)*

(Action completed.)

J. Campbell

(Index.)

H. B. Bailey

Next Paper.

3098

(Minutes.)

Draft submitted.

*H. B. Bailey 14/*  
*Repeated to New York (U.K. Delegation)*

Sir O. Sargent has asked to see this paper  
 minuted.

2. It is certainly desirable that we should keep  
 in as close touch as possible with Saudi Arabian  
 Government and the other Arabian Governments over  
 the reference of the Palestine question to the  
 United Nations and that we should really make  
 them feel that we are taking full account of their  
 views and feelings in the matter.

3. Sheikh Youssif Yassin appears, however, to  
 be suggesting that we should reach agreement with  
 the Arab Governments in advance on the policy  
 which we think ought to be followed and this is  
 further than we can really go, particularly as he  
 appears to want us to agree that the appointment of  
 a Committee to investigate the question would be  
 undesirable. The appointment of such a Committee  
 is indeed, in our view, unavoidable and the object  
 of the Special Session is to create one (and,  
 incidentally, the appointment of such a Committee has  
 already been included as an item for the provision-  
 al agenda of the forthcoming Special Session of  
 the Assembly).

4. The anxieties of the Arab Governments about the  
 consequences of appointing such a Committee are  
 understandable and it is possible that they would be  
 reduced if the Committee were a purely fact finding  
 one and were not empowered to make recommendations.  
 This is perhaps a point on which we can (and should)  
 meet the Arab Governments. It would certainly  
 seem to be a suitable subject for discussion

between/

32003 F.O.P.

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Reference:

FO 371/61874

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between our own Delegation in New York and the Arab Delegations. With a view to such discussion we should consider this aspect of the matter further and give Sir A. Cadogan the necessary guidance.

5. Meanwhile, the attached telegram, if approved, should go off as soon as possible in order that Cairo can answer Sheikh Youssif Yassin before the meeting of the Arab Foreign Ministers on April 19th.

*I.P. Garran*

I.P. Garran.  
15th April, 1947.

The general line of this <sup>draft</sup> telegram has been cleared with C.O. We shall have to get their views about the terms of ref. for the Special Committee.

*M. Smith*  
15/iv.

*20 Apr 6*

sent  
April 16 119  
8/1. Martin  
P.O.  
April 19

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WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

3096

14 APR 1944

12th April, 1947.

R. 9.00 p.m. 12th April, 1947.

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Reference: **FO 371 61874**

FO 371/61874

United States Ministers at Jeddah and Cairo had handed Saudi-Arabian and Egyptian Governments memorandum suggesting at special meeting question of appointment of committee of enquiry should be discussed. The Arab Governments were opposed to the appointment of a Committee and wished the Palestine question to be discussed by the General Assembly without reference to a Committee which might investigate and act to their disadvantage as in case of the recent Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry.

The Sheik thought the majority of Arab States, perhaps all, wanted to go to United Nations in agreement with Great Britain as to a procedure and he thought such an agreement was to our interest.

The Sheik asked that above might be regarded as coming only from Saudi-Arabia and as private and confidential. What answer should I give to Youssif Yassin who urges that he be given answer before meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Arab States on April 19th to consider the Palestine question ?



No. E 3096/951/51

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential  
Restricted.  
Open.

I.  
P.  
G.

*Draft.*

H.M. Ambassador  
Cairo.

**Telegram.**

No. 794

(Date) April 16

*immediati*  
Repeat to :—

Bagdad No. 1333  
Jedda No. 195  
Damascus No. 216  
Beirut No. 266  
Amman No. 173  
Jerusalem No. 32  
B.M.E.O. (Cairo) No. 11  
New York No. 11

U.N. (Political)  
Department to see

*En Clair*  
*Gode.*  
*Cypher.*

**Distribution :—**

World Organisation

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Mr. Martin, C.O.

MB

OUT FILE

*F. O.,*

121

April 1947.

Despatched

 $M.$ 

**IMMEDIATE**

IMMEDIATE  
S.C. [Cairo only] (Please pass to B.M.E.O. as MYTEL 397.  
and IMMEDIATE)

Your telegram No. 895 of 12th April:  
Palestine and the United Nations.

If the intention behind Sheikh Yussif Yassin's suggestion is that there should be a preliminary ~~understanding~~ <sup>agreement</sup> between Great Britain and Saudi Arabia regarding procedure at the / special

United Nations Assembly, this would seem likely to commit us rather too rigidly in advance of the meeting. We welcome, however, the suggestion that there should be close consultation between H.M.G. and the Saudi Arabian and other Arab Governments and you should inform Sheikh Yussif Yassin accordingly, adding that it <sup>will</sup> ~~would~~ be most useful if close <sup>could</sup> ~~is~~ maintained in New York between the U.K. Delegation and the Arab Delegations.

2. You should explain however that it will not in any case be possible for H.M.G. to meet the Arab Governments' views regarding the non-appointment of a committee. In fact, the object of the special session of the Assembly is to create such a committee and, as the Arab Governments will now ~~already~~ know, the appointment of a committee already appears ~~as the last item~~ on the provisional agenda. We proposed this procedure because we could not expect the General Assembly to reach any conclusions about Palestine until the matter had been first examined by a committee.

and/

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3148 Wt 26469/137 50m 9/46 (51) F.&amp;S.

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FO 371/61874



and we feared that, if the committee was not appointed until the Assembly met for its regular annual session in September, there would not be time for its report to be received and considered this year. The Arab States will be represented at the special session and will be able to express their views, and it will be for the special session to determine the terms of reference of the committee, e.g. whether it should be purely fact-finding or whether it should be authorised to make recommendations. This seems to be the sort of question on which there might well be close consultation between the U.K. and Arab delegations in New York.

3. <sup>X</sup> For your own information, while we understand the fear of the Arab Governments that an unfavourable report from the Committee might make it more difficult for them to obtain a fair hearing for their point of view in September, we do not think that a report of a committee confined to fact-finding and analysis of the problem would have this effect, and we are ourselves inclined to doubt whether the committee should be authorised to make recommendations. This is a question which will require further consideration.

*For Cairo only* *etc* *AP 16*

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OUT FILE

123

3 3096/951/31

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Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION  
DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO  
(AMBASSADOR)

No. 794

D. 2.30 a.m. 17th April, 1947.

16th April, 1947.

Repeated to : Bagdad No. 1333      Jerusalem  
                  Jedda No. 195      British Middle East Office,  
                  Damascus No. 216      Cairo, No. 397  
                  Beirut No. 266      United Kingdom Delegation,  
                  Amman No. 173      New York, No. 1160

IMMEDIATE

MEMORANDUM

Your telegram No. 895 [of 12th April: Palestine and the United Nations].

is that there should be a preliminary agreement between Great Britain and Saudi Arabia regarding procedure at the special United Nations Assembly, this would seem likely to commit us rather too rigidly in advance of the meeting. We welcome, however, the suggestion that there should be close consultation between His Majesty's Government and the Saudi Arabian and other Arab Governments and you should inform Sheikh Yussif Yassin accordingly, adding that it will be most useful if close contact can be maintained in New York between the United Kingdom Delegation and the Arab Delegation.

2. You should explain, however, that it will not in any case be possible for His Majesty's Government to meet the Arab Governments' views regarding the non-appointment of a committee. In fact, the object of the special session of the Assembly is to create such a committee and, as the Arab Governments will now know, the appointment of a committee already appears on the provisional agenda. We proposed this procedure because we could not expect the General Assembly to reach any conclusions about Palestine until the matter had been first examined by a committee; and we feared that, if the committee was not

appointed

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3. For your own information, while we understand the fear of the Arab Governments that an unfavourable report from the Committee might make it more difficult for them to obtain a fair hearing for their point of view in September, we do not think that a report of a committee confined to fact-finding and analysis of the problem would have this effect, and we are ourselves inclined to doubt whether the committee should be authorised to make recommendations. This is a question which will require further consideration.

[Cairo only.] (Please pass to British Middle East Office  
as my telegram No. 397 Immediate.)

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Reference: **FO 371/61874**

1947

# E

E 3008

125

PALESTINE

14 JAN 1947

Registry  
Number

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

*Dated*

Received  
in Registry

E 3098/957/31

M. Eyns

*Parabius*

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12 April 1944

114

Palatine and U.N

Refers to 1061 293 (E 2143/951/31) After  
on hearing that a special session of General  
Assembly of U.N. would be convened to appoint  
a preparatory committee on Palestine, Syrian  
Prime Minister stated that a special meeting  
of Foreign Ministers of Arab League would  
have to be convened without delay to  
consider Policy.

**Last Paper.**

3096

## References.

(Minutes.)

173. 16/4

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

8/16/27/4

24/8/48

**Next Paper.**

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## Reference

FO 371/61874

E/26..  
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FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Eyres.  
No. 111

D. 4.6 p.m. GMT 10th April 1947.  
R. 6.30 p.m. BST 10th April 1947.

10th April 1947.

Repeated to: Cairo (Ambassador)  
B.M.E.O. Cairo,  
Bagdad,  
Jerusalem,  
Jedda  
Amman  
Beirut Saving.

E 3088

14 APR 1947

V V V

Your telegram No. 293 to Bagdad: Special Session of United Nations Assembly.

On hearing that a special session of General Assembly of United Nations would be convened to appoint a preparatory committee on Palestine, meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Arab League would have to be convened without delay to consider policy.

2. Official of Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that no date has yet been fixed for such a meeting nor has a decision been reached as to where it will take place (contrary to the statement in general overseas service of the B.B.C. on April 6th naming Damascus).



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